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0 Say, Can You See:
Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses
Jeannine Bell*
Scholarship on cross burning has paid scant attention to the full context
of the act of burning a cross. Many First Amendment scholars generally ig-
nore cross burning's historical underpinnings. Those scholars who do rec-
ognize the historical importance of cross burning as a threat to African Ameri-
cans do not fully address its place in First Amendment doctrine. Scholars in
neither group acknowledge the contemporary use of cross burning by those
with anti-integrationist ends.
This Article presents a comprehensive, context-based theory that both
places cross burning in its proper doctrinal framework and recognizes the
history of cross burning as one of Ku Klux Klan-inspired terrorism directed
at African Americans. The author prefaces critical commentary on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black with analysis of the full land-
scape of cross burning cases including another issue to which others have
paid little attention-the ways in which state courts have negotiated First
Amendment challenges to cross burning statutes. Thoroughly examining cross
burning from each of these perspectives, the Article argues that cross burn-
ing should be treated as hate crime, which may be prosecuted, rather than
as constitutionally protected hate speech.
Few things can chill free expression and association to the bone
like night-riders outside the door and a fiery cross in the yard.'
INTRODUCTION
Russ and Laura Jones began experiencing trouble with skinheads soon
after moving to a working-class white neighborhood in St. Paul, Minnesota.
The Joneses were the only Blacks living in the neighborhood, which was
well-known among local Blacks for its racism. Within weeks of moving
in, the Joneses found the tires on their new station wagon slashed. The
next month, the tailgate of their car was broken. A few weeks later, their
son was called a "nigger" on their front sidewalk. About three months
after they moved in, at 2:30 in the morning, the first cross was burned.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). A.B., Harvard Col-
lege; J.D., University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D. (Political Science) University of
Michigan. I would like to extend special thanks to Kevin Brown, Dan Conkle, Perry
Hodges, Dawn Johnsen, Guy Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Emily M.S. Houh, Anthony R.
Miles, Florence Roisman, and Susan Williams for their valuable comments. I am grateful
to Dan Strunk for his research assistance. Many thanks to the editors of the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, particularly Shanya Dingle, for their invaluable edito-
rial suggestions.
'State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479, 482 (Fla. 1995).
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Within a two-hour time span, a group of skinheads burned three crosses
in the yard of or in close proximity to the Joneses' house.2
Firm supporters of the First Amendment, the Joneses were not as wor-
ried about the message the skinheads were trying to communicate as they
were concerned about what the skinheads might do next.3 Russ Jones re-
called: "When I saw that cross burning on our lawn, I thought of the sto-
ries my grandparents told about living in the South and being intimidated
by white people. When a cross was burned down there they either meant
to harm you or put you in your place."4 To the Joneses, the cross burning
was clearly a threat. They were worried about placing their children in dan-
ger. Like numerous African Americans who have faced this type of neigh-
borhood violence, when they called the police, the Joneses learned that
they could not rely on law enforcement to protect them. 5 The police were
able to offer little if any help to the family. Mr. Jones recalled:
When they arrived, the police themselves didn't seem to know
what to do. They seemed shocked by the cross, but after asking
the usual questions, they packed up to leave saying they didn't
have any suspects because there were no witnesses.6
That would have been the end of the story, had not one of the skin-
heads bragged to his friends about his role in the cross burning.7 He and
others, court documents later revealed, had been trying to drive the Jone-
ses out of the neighborhood. They were "really disgusted" at having an
African American family living across the street and were trying to "do
something about it."' During their discussion of what they were going to
do to get rid of the Joneses, one of the skinheads suggested slashing the
2 See United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1994).
Though the perpetrators' freedom of speech was not their predominant concern, Russ
and Laura Jones emphasized in interviews that because they are minorities and Jehovah's
Witnesses, they especially value their First Amendment rights. See Laura J. Lederer, The
Case of the Cross Burning: An Interview with Russ and Laura Jones, in THE PRICE WE
PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 30
(Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995) [hereinafter Lederer, Interview].4 1d.
'See JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED: LAW ENFORCEMENT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
HATE CRIME 115-16 (2002) (detailing failure of district police officers to investigate hate
crime); Elizabeth Boyd et al., Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice: Categorization of Hate-
Motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 819 (1996) (describing
failure of police officers to investigate incidents of hate crime); Leonard S. Rubinowitz &
Imani Perry, Crimes without Punishment: White Neighbors' Resistance to Black Entry, 92
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 384-88 (2002) (describing failure of the police to take
serious action in response to racially motivated attempts to drive minorities out of white
neighborhoods).
6 Lederer, Interview, supra note 3, at 29.
7 According to the Joneses, the perpetrator, Robert A. Viktora, was caught because he
was overheard bragging to friends about having burned the crosses. The person who over-
head Viktora bragging provided an anonymous tip to the police. Id.
8 J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826-27 (8th Cir. 1994).
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tires of the Joneses' car. That had already been done, replied another, and
it hadn't worked.9
One of the skinheads who burned the cross on the Joneses' lawn,
"R.A.V.," was charged with violating St. Paul's bias crime ordinance. His
First Amendment challenge to the law became R.A.V v. City of St. Paul. °
When the Supreme Court overturned the St. Paul ordinance in R.A. V, the
skinheads took the decision as a victory and celebrated. The Joneses re-
membered the skinheads gathering directly across the street from their
house after the Court decision. Laura Jones recalled:
They had a rally on one sunny Sunday afternoon, wearing their
masks, wielding their baseball bats and clubs, waving their Con-
federate flags .... It was awful. I felt trapped in my own home.
We didn't go anywhere because I would have had to face them
and could never tell what they would do."l
The Court's decision in R.A.V paved the way for many such First
Amendment "victories" for skinheads and other would-be cross burners.
Relying on R.A. V, state courts in Washington, South Carolina, Maryland,
and New Jersey held their cross-burning statutes unconstitutional. In Black
v. Commonwealth,2 the Virginia Supreme Court struck down on First
Amendment grounds Virginia's law barring cross burning. According to
the Virginia court, R.A.V left it no choice but to invalidate the statute. 13
When the Virginia case came before the United States Supreme Court
in Virginia v. Black, 4 the Court evaluated the Commonwealth's arguments
that Virginia's cross-burning statute did not violate the First Amendment.
The Court ultimately found, for reasons discussed infra Part III, that the
Virginia cross-burning statute impermissibly regulated protected speech.
In a move that surprised many, however, the Court held that cross burning
statutes are not per se violations of the First Amendment, and that states
may ban cross burning in cases in which the perpetrator intended to in-
timidate when burning the cross.
In R.A. V, and to a lesser extent in Black, the Supreme Court failed to
understand fully a crucial fact that remains largely unrecognized in other
9 Id. at 827.
10505 U.S. 377 (1992). R.A.V was the first Supreme Court case to consider a First
Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a statute aimed at regulating cross burn-
ing. In R.A.V, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul statute that regulated the place-
ment of symbols, including burning crosses, on the grounds that the statute was content-
based regulation of protected speech. Id. at 391.
"1 Lederer, Interview, supra note 3, at 31.
12 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003).
13 Black, 553 S.E.2d at 742 ("Any question about the constitutional infirmity of such
selective proscription of speech was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
[R.A. V].").
14 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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courts' opinions and legal scholarship in this area. This Article argues
that the situational and the historical contexts of cross burnings are criti-
cal parts of how they should be analyzed. This expanded examination of
context suggests that many cross burnings should be understood not as pro-
tected speech, but as unprotected activity that can be criminalized as hate
crime.
First Amendment scholarship on threats has paid scant attention to
the real-world circumstances in which cross burning takes place.' Schol-
ars and many courts examining First Amendment challenges in cross-
burning cases seem to have forgotten that in First Amendment law, as in
everything else, context matters. Much attention is paid to cross burning
as a form of expressive conduct designed to convey racist views. Looking
specifically to the empirical reality of cross burning reveals, however, that
the primary aim of many who burn crosses is not to communicate racist
views. Burned crosses are not intended as symbolic statements of racist
views, but rather as instruments designed to terrorize. In fact, like the
skinheads who terrorized the Joneses, cross burners have often already
expressed their views verbally before the cross burning. Not content just
to speak, these individuals must act to accomplish their goal-driving out
minorities who have moved to white neighborhoods. By divorcing cross
burnings from their situational context, these scholars and judges have
reached bizarre results that are inconsistent with courts' approaches to
other types of activities in similar contexts.
This Article shows how injecting the history of cross burning and its
empirical reality into the debate over how we treat cross burning can as-
sist courts and commentators to better understand the nature of cross burn-
ing and to situate assessment of cross burning activity within the appro-
priate line of precedent. The Article offers a context-based approach to
First Amendment analysis of cross burning statutes. The proposed analy-
sis places this form of conduct in its proper doctrinal place, as a hate crime.
In Part I, the Article places the general phenomenon of cross burning
in its appropriate legal, social, and historical context. It begins by high-
lighting the importance of context to First Amendment doctrine, particu-
larly in the area of threats. It continues by putting cross burning in his-
torical and contemporary context, discussing the origins of cross burning
and how the Klan and others have used and continue to use cross burning
to terrorize and threaten Blacks and other minorities.
's For a sample of articles on threats and cross burning that fail to discuss the historical
context of cross burning, see, for example, Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the
Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 281 (1995); Charles Fried, The New First
Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); John Roth-
child, Menacing Speech and the First Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement
that Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207 (1999); Rodney A. Smolla, Terrorism and the
Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 551 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Con-
duct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1993); Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making
Hate Crime a Trivial Pursuit, 25 CONN. L. REV. 299 (1999).
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Part II analyzes the ways in which states have approached cross
burning. In this Part, the Article details several states' cross-burning stat-
utes and the wide-scale failure of many state courts to appreciate the full
context of cross burning. In Part III, the Article offers a critical perspec-
tive on Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court's somewhat surprising deci-
sion to uphold state statutes that prohibit cross burning undertaken with
intent to intimidate. In light of the Court's decision in R.A.V, which re-
mains good law, Black embodies a seemingly inconsistent approach to
cross burning. This Part of the Article argues that the Court's decision in
Black was not as favorable to victims as it has been described.
Part IV sets forth an alternative to the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Black and R.A. V, as well as by several of the state supreme courts
that have struck down crossburning statutes. This proposed approach ad-
vocates a victim-centered, context-based evaluation of cross burning for
First Amendment protection. The Article argues that such an approach more
realistically accounts for the intentions of the perpetrators and circum-
stances under which the vast majority of cross burnings occur. The Arti-
cle contends that cross burnings specifically targeted at identified victims
should be evaluated as hate crimes, rather than protected speech.
I. SPEECH, MEANING, AND HISTORY: THE BURNING OF CROSSES IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
[C]ontext is critical .... This makes sense, because without
context, a burning cross or dead rat mean nothing. 16
A. Courts and the Context of Speech
Courts interpreting the First Amendment place a premium on protecting
expression that has an identifiable message or meaning. Much attention is
paid to identifying the message that the speaker is trying to communicate.
The speaker's message is important because courts often look to whether the
state has aimed the regulation at the content of the message. That content
may therefore matter in determining whether the state was acting uncon-
stitutionally in trying to silence him or her. A state would normally not be
considered to have an impermissible purpose in, for example, regulating
random sidewalk chalking, but a court would take a very different view if
the state regulated only chalking that criticized the state's governor.
Though content-based regulation is generally impermissible, there
are some exceptions under which the state may regulate particular cate-
gories of unprotected speech. One such exception has been delineated for
16 Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1078-79 (9th
Cir. 2002).
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so-called "true threats." This Article argues that actions like the burning
of the cross on the Joneses' lawn are true threats that ought not be con-
sidered protected speech. In Watts v. United States,7 the seminal case on
true threats, the Supreme Court highlighted the need for words to be
viewed in context. When considering the extent to which the First Amend-
ment protects speech that may be threatening, it is especially important
to evaluate the factual context in which the speech or symbolic expres-
sion occurred." Watts involved a protestor convicted of violating a 1917
statute that prohibits an individual from "knowingly and willfully ...
[making] any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the
President of the United States."' 9 At an anti-war rally at the Washington
Monument, Watts, an eighteen-year-old protestor, said:
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have al-
ready received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to
report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my
sights is L.B.J .... They are not going to make me kill my black
brothers.2 °
The fact that Watts was speaking at a public anti-war rally, and that the
crowd did not take his remarks to represent a serious threat to kill the Presi-
dent, were important contextual variables relevant to the Court's decision
that Watts's speech was not a true threat. The Court found that the defen-
dant's words constituted protected crude political language rather than
constitutionally regulable true threats. The Court reversed Watts's con-
viction, reasoning that true threats could be distinguished from political
hyperbole, and that Watts's speech fell into the latter category. The context
of the words used, their conditional nature, and the reaction of the listen-
ers all suggested to the Court that the defendant meant only to be critical
of the government, rather than actually to threaten the President's life.2'
Since Watts, the Supreme Court has never examined the boundaries
of the true threats exception.22 Lower courts, however, have fashioned
tests for what constitutes a true threat23 in the process of analyzing threats
17 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
18 See John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42
BUFF. L. REV. 653, 672 (1994).
19 Watts, 394 U.S. at 705.20 Id. at 706.
21 Id. at 708.
22 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 ("Apart from holding that Watts's crack
about L.B.J. was not a true threat, the Court set out no standard for determining when a
statement is a true threat that is unprotected speech under the First Amendment.").
23 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'x" 283, 302-13 (2001) (discussing circuit court opinions).
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to kill the President, 24 the speech of protestors, 25 and cross burning.26 Sev-
eral federal circuits have defined true threats as involving intentional be-
havior that entails serious expressions of intent to harm. 21 Courts have
looked to context to help decipher the meaning of the language used be-
cause the context in which the speech is made is an important marker of
whether the speech constitutes a true threat or protected expression. 28 Con-
textual variables include the setting in which the speech was used; the
identities of the speakers and listeners; the intent of the speaker; the
groups to which the speaker and listener belong and the current and his-
torical relationships between those groups; the mode and manner of ex-
pression chosen by the speaker; and the reaction of listeners and witnesses.
Courts have held that a speaker's words constitute a threat even in the
absence of the speaker's testimony that he or she intended to threaten.
For example, in Roy v. United States,29 the Ninth Circuit upheld a sol-
dier's conviction on charges that he had threatened to kill the President,
despite evidence that he had not intended to actually threaten the Presi-
dent's life. Roy, a U.S. Marine waiting to be flown from Camp Pendleton
to Vietnam, told a telephone operator, "I hear the President is coming to
the base. I am going to get him."30 Despite evidence that Roy made the
statements because he wished to be reassigned to a location in the United
States, the court held that the words used by Roy, given the context and
circumstances in which they were said, constituted a threat.
If a threat is made in a context or under such circumstances
wherein it appears that it is a serious threat .... even though the
maker of the threat does not have an actual intention to assault
the President, an apparently serious threat may cause the mis-
chief or evil toward which the statute in part was directed.3'
24 See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Miller, 115 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.
1984); United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Carrier, 672
F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Fredrickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1979); Roy
v. United States 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ogren, 54 M.J. 481
(C.A.A.F. 2001).
2 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1058 (finding that abortion protestors' post-
ers were true threats). Cf. also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-29
(1982) (despite civil rights protestor's call for violence, context of speech meant that
statements were protected).26 See, e.g., United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1310 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d
821 (8th Cir. 1994); Singer v. United States, No. 94-3039, 1994 WL 589562, at *1 (6th Cir.
Oct. 24, 1994).
27 Rothchild, supra note 15, at 212-13.
28 Nockleby, supra note 18, at 673.
29 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969).
30 Id. at 875.
1 Id. at 877.
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A similar result, in which examining context meant finding a threat
despite the defendant's intentions to the contrary, occurred in United States
v. Ogren.32 The defendant in Ogren had been in pre-trial confinement
awaiting court-martial on an unrelated charge when he told Petty Officer
Lyell: "Fuck off. And fuck the rest of the staff. Fuck Admiral Green. Hell,
fuck the President, too.... [As] a matter of fact, if I could get out of here
right now, I would get a gun and kill that bastard."33 When asked if he
owned guns, Ogren replied that he had access to them. Ogren later claimed
he was just blowing off steam. Although there was no evidence that Ogren
had made assassination plans, after evaluating the context-he yelled the
words from his cell, he asked whether receiving a dishonorable discharge
would prevent him from getting weapons, and he was surrounded by listen-
ers who took him seriously-the court held Ogren's words to be a true
threat.3 4
Several circuits have used the hearer's perception of the statement's
seriousness as a deciding factor.3 5 The Ninth Circuit, for example, applied
a "reasonable speaker" test36 in Planned Parenthood v. American Coali-
tion of Life Activists.37 The court in Planned Parenthood evaluated the
extent to which the First Amendment protected the Internet publication
of "Wanted" posters naming doctors who had performed abortions. Doc-
tors depicted on similar "Wanted" posters had been shot and killed. That
fact, combined with the fear that the "Wanted" posters caused, signaled
to the court that the posters constituted a true threat. In identifying the
posters as a true threat, the court made an analogy to cross burning. "The
posters are true threats because, like ... burning crosses, they connote
something they do not literally say, yet both the actor and the recipient
get the message.""
A full examination of the context of the threat requires courts to look
to the surrounding events to determine whether an individual's speech actu-
ally constituted a threat. This includes the circumstances in which the
statement was made and the defendant's behavior while engaged in the
expression at issue.
32 54 M.J. 481 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
33 Id. at 482.
3 Id. at 487-88.
35 Rothman, supra note 23, at 302. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705
(1969); United States v. Hanna, 293 E3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. J.H.H., 22
F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 .3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Ogren, 54 M.J. 481 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
36 The Ninth Circuit's test, applied in United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262
(9th Cir. 1990), asks "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would
be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious ex-
pression of intent to harm or assault." Id. at 1265.
37 290 .3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002).38 Id. at 1085.
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B. The Ku Klux Klan and Burning Crosses
As described above, courts applying the First Amendment have looked
to the context of the expression to evaluate whether or not it deserves pro-
tection. According to these courts, the context may be drawn from the
ways in which the expression is used, and may involve related events that
occur either at the time the expression occurs or in the immediate after-
math.
Attempting to expand this issue of context somewhat, this Article ar-
gues that particular events can have both historical and situational context.
Events like cross burning, which have occurred repeatedly in the same or
similar ways over a period of time, have both a historical context and a
situational context. The historical context describes the way in which a
particular type of event, such. as the burning of a cross, has been gener-
ally used and understood by a particular group of people over a discrete pe-
riod of time. I use the term situational context to refer to the circum-
stances of a particular event, for example the cross burning on the Jone-
ses' front lawn. This Article argues that courts should take into account
both situational and historical context in considering the extent to which
the First Amendment protects cross burning. This Part begins by describing
the historical context in which cross burning must be understood.
The meaning of a burning cross is strongly, perhaps indelibly, con-
nected with the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK" or "Klan"). From its founding
during Reconstruction, the Klan used violence and terror to "re-establish
control of the black labor force, and restore racial subordination in every
aspect of Southern life. '39 The Reconstruction Klan had faded into ob-
scurity by the turn of the century, but a second Klan soon reappeared,
sparked by D.W. Griffith's 1915 film, Birth of a Nation, and based on
Thomas Dixon's novel The Clansman.n°
39 
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 426 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., Perennial Library 1989)
(1988). See also GAIL WILLIAMS O'BRIEN, THE COLOR OF LAW: RACE, VIOLENCE AND
JUSTICE IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II SOUTH 114-18 (1999). Klan violence during Recon-
struction was maintained by individual klans set up throughout the South. Violence
wrought by the Klan during this time period included threats, floggings, mutilation and
murders. See, e.g., DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 10 (3d ed. 1981);
O'BRIEN, supra, at 114-18.
40 The Clansman depicted Reconstruction Klansmen burning crosses as they defended
threats to the honor of the South posed by Northerners. Some have speculated that the
burning cross originated from Dixon's imagination. Historian Wyn Craig Wade writes:
Burning crosses had never been part of the Reconstruction Ku-Klux. They had
come from the exotic imagination of Thomas Dixon, whose fictional Klansmen
had felt so much tangible pride in their Scottish ancestry, they revived the use of
burning crosses as signal fires from one clan to another.
WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 146 (1987).
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Birth of a Nation depicts the ravaging of a young white woman
(played by actress Lillian Gish) by a lust-filled Black man. It goes on to
depict members of the Klan as they find and lynch the perpetrator, and
then gather, hooded, around a flaming cross. The film, which had private
screenings at the White House for President Woodrow Wilson and Justices
of the Supreme Court, enjoyed great popular success. 41 In fact, not until
Gone with the Wind was released in 1939 was Birth of a Nation surpassed
in attendance. 42
The 1915 lynching of Leo Frank demonstrated the Klan's resurgence
and the importance of the burning cross in avenging disruptions to the
social order. Frank, a Jewish businessman in Atlanta, was falsely con-
victed of the rape and murder of a thirteen-year-old girl, Mary Phagan.43
Phagan quickly became a symbol of the need to protect the South from
carpetbaggers and Blacks. A group that called itself the "Knights of Mary
Phagan," fearing that Frank might be pardoned, dragged him from prison
and hanged him.' After the murder the group climbed Stone Mountain
and burned a huge cross that was said, in one account, to be "visible
throughout the city. 45
The revival of the Klan did not occur spontaneously. William Sim-
mons, a professional promoter of fraternal orders, capitalized on the hysteria
after Frank's murder and the notoriety surrounding Birth of a Nation.
Simmons gathered new members, including two members of the Recon-
struction Klan. At the initiation of the 1915 revival of the Klan, held on
Stone Mountain, Simmons lit a sixteen-foot tall cross.' He recalled:
[B]athed in the sacred glow of the fiery cross, the Invisible Em-
pire was called from its slumber of half a century to take up a new
task and fulfill a new mission for humanity's good and to call
back to mortal habitation the good angel of practical fraternity
among men.47
By the 1920s, the burning cross was linked indisputably with the
Klan. In the 1920s, an Indianapolis-based magazine called The Fiery Cross
was strongly aligned with the Klan." Enormous burning crosses were part
41 JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE
RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 176 (1984).
42 Id.
43 WADE, supra note 40, at 143. Frank-was exonerated of all wrongdoing by a witness's
deathbed statement in 1982. Id.
Id. at 144.
41 Id. (punctuation omitted).
46 Id. at 144-46; RICHARD K. TUCKER, THE DRAGON AND THE CROSS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN MIDDLE AMERICA 18 (1991).
41 JOHN MOFFATT MECKLIN, THE Ku KLUX KLAN: A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN MIND
5 (1924).
41 WADE, supra note 40, at 226.
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of many outdoor Klan rallies. The rallies were often held on high places
where the enormous "burlap-wrapped and kerosene-soaked wooden cross"
could be seen from a distance.49 Attendees sang "Onward Christian Sol-
diers" and the cross was then lit. The lighting of the cross was followed
by an "explosion of kerosene" and a "rush of flames."5 In some areas,
Klansmen added to the spectacle by detonating dynamite.5 As the cross
burned, audience members raised their left arms in salute and sang "The
Old Rugged Cross."52
The burning cross came to be so closely associated with the Klan and
its violent tactics that it was the perfect instrument of terror. The Klan
used burning crosses to terrorize Blacks, labor organizers, and anyone
who transgressed social boundaries. 3 "The burning cross symbolized the
Ku Klux Klan. Usually when a cross burned, a lynching followed ....
The burning cross signaled [people] to come out and start a fire or burn
or flog a Negro."54 By the 1940s, the burning cross was used solely for
intimidation; it was no longer associated with religion in Klan dogma.55
Crosses were burned in the early 1960s to terrorize Blacks involved in
civil rights activism. In January 1964, for example, more than 150 crosses
were burned near Black homes and churches in Louisiana.5 6
C. Contemporary Uses of Cross Burning
For minorities and enemies of the Klan there were few, if any, inno-
cent cross burnings. The association between the burning cross and vio-
lent intimidation of racial, ethnic and religious minorities-or anyone
else who might be an enemy of the Klan-was strengthened as cross burn-
ings continued to be accompanied by acts of violence. Frequently, cross
burnings served as a precursor to other types of violence. In other cases,





51 See id. at 263-64, 279, 290. For example, in June 1949 Klansmen broke into the
home of a woman they believed to be renting rooms to unmarried couples. They dragged
her outside where she was forced to watch them bum a cross on her lawn. Id. at 290.
14 DeNeen L. Brown, Cross Case Stirs Debate Over Rights: Fairfax Judge Calls Law
Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1991, at D5 (quoting Kenneth S. Tollett, Professor,
Howard University) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Id.
56 WADE, supra note 40, at 329.
57 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 3, 4 & n.2, Virginia v. Black, 123 S.
Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Charles H. Jones, Proscribing Hate: Distinctions Between
Criminal Harm and Protected Expression, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 935, 948 (1992);
Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 342 (discussing the possibility of calculated cam-
paigns to eject families, beginning with acts such as cross burnings, window breaking, or
threatening phone calls, and culminating in the bombing of the family's home).
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cross burnings formed part of a series of violent actions, such as gun-
shots, assaults, fire bombings and murder.58
Non-Klansmen capitalized upon the connection between the burning
cross and Klan-inspired terror. After the 1960s, burning crosses were used
as an instrument by whites who were not connected with the Klan. Indi-
viduals who engaged in violence against minorities did not necessarily
share the same white supremacist ideology as the Klan. Rather, their
struggles were focused solely on restricting minority migration to white
neighborhoods. During the postwar years, in both the North and the South,
"the most explosive issue (literally) stemmed from efforts by whites to keep
Blacks out of their neighborhoods." 9
Cross burning was part of a long list of violent actions used by those
who opposed minority integration to police neighborhood boundaries. In
cities around the country, white residents resorted to bombings, arson,
battery, vandalism and harassment to drive the "intruders" from "their"
neighborhoods. In Cleveland, Detroit, Boston, Chicago, and other cities,
minority newcomers faced organized violent opposition to their presence,
as neighborhood residents sought to "collectively establish and enforce
an extralegal 'right' to practice racial discrimination."'
Minorities moving into all-white neighborhoods have faced this
violence in spite of civil rights laws and general criminal laws designed
to protect their rights. One example involved Mattie Harrell, whose fam-
ily experienced five incidents of gunfire at their new home during the first
five months that they lived in an all-white neighborhood in Vineland,
New Jersey in 1994.61 Harrell and her family were the first African Ameri-
cans to move to the neighborhood. After five months, the police arrested
a white man, Charles Apprendi, who told them he had fired at the house
because he wanted to give Ms. Harrell and her family the message that
they were not wanted.
Harrell said that the gun shots had a tremendous effect on the family:
"It tore the whole family up .... We will never be the same."62 The first
bullet pierced the wall near her eight-year-old son Michael's bed. Six
years later, Michael still had trouble sleeping. 63 The violence experienced
by families like the Harrells and the Joneses (whose story is recounted at
18 See MICHAEL NEWTON & JUDY ANN NEWTON, THE Ku KLUX KLAN: AN ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 583 (1991) (describing a series of cross burnings and vandalism directed at
Jewish fishermen); Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 382 (detailing cross burning and
brick throwing targeted at a Jewish office holder).
19 O'BRIEN, supra note 39, at 110.
6o Margalynne Armstrong, Protecting Privilege: Race, Residence and Rodney King, 12
LAW & INEQUALITY 351, 361 (1994). See also REYNOLDS FARLEY ET AL., DETROIT Di-
VIDED 145-49 (2000); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND
HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960, at 40-67 (1983).
61 Maria Newman, Victim of Hate Crime Calls High Court Ruling a "Slap in the
Face," N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at B5.
62 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id.
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the beginning of this Article) encouraged resident minorities to leave
white neighborhoods and discouraged other minorities from moving in.
Several years after the incident, Ms. Harrell and her children were still
the only African American family living in the neighborhood. 64
In the 1990s, with the increasing passage of local and state hate crime
laws, incidents of violence directed against minorities in and around their
homes began to be recognized as hate crimes. In several cities, a significant
percentage of reported hate crimes occurred in neighborhoods that were
integrating. For instance, in Chicago between 1985 and 1990, half of the
1129 incidents reported as hate crimes occurred in ten communities un-
dergoing racial demographic change.65 In Los Angeles, sixty percent of
the racially motivated hate crimes reported to the city's Human Relations
Commission involved African Americans; seventy percent occurred at
the victim's residence.6 6 Blacks moving into white neighborhoods in the
1980s and 1990s faced similar violence in Philadelphia, Boston, and New
York City.67 A study of 365 cases investigated by the Hate Crimes Unit of
the Boston Police Department revealed that the third most frequent rea-
son for hate crime was "moving to a neighborhood. 68 So frequent are such
acts of violence that scholars have a specific name for the phenomenon:
"move-in" violence.69
Social scientists have established a clear link between racially moti-
vated crime and minority integration of white neighborhoods. One study
of bias-motivated crime in the 1980s and 1990s in New York City found
that increases in anti-Black, anti-Latino, and anti-Asian crime tracked
movement by each of these groups into white strongholds.70 In the study,
the greatest proportion of anti-minority attacks in the city occurred in
formerly all-white neighborhoods that minorities were in the process of
integrating. Researchers speculated that racism, nostalgia, and self-interest,
in conjunction with "exclusionary sentiment and tacit support (or active
encouragement) of neighbors leads to a heightened propensity for action
64 Id.
65 DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 90 (1993).
66 Id. at 90-91. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, "MOVE-IN VIOLENCE": WHITE
RESISTANCE TO NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION IN THE 1980s (1987); John 0. Calmore,
Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067,
1116 (1998); Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the
Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2290 (2001);
Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and The Harms
of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 118 (1997).
67 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 65, at 91. For more discussion of this phenomenon,
see Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The Intersec-
tion of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity and the Master Nar-
rative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69 (1995).
6 JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND
BLOODSHED 246 (1993).
69 Id.
70 Donald P. Green et al., Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Moti-
vated Crime, 104 AM. J. SOC. 372, 397 (1998).
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when racial homogeneity is threatened."'" Despite minorities' attempts to
protect themselves through the use of hate crime statutes and other civil
rights laws, neighborhood resistance to minority integration may be ac-
companied by a failure of the local police to enforce the law against per-
petrators engaged in racist violence aimed at new homeowners.72
From the 1970s to the 1990s, all over the country, whites unaffiliated
with the Klan used cross burnings to threaten African Americans or bira-
cial couples who had moved into formerly all-white neighborhoods. Cross
burnings were a particularly powerful choice for those trying to threaten
newcomers, in part "because of their historical symbolism of white su-
premacists and the extreme threats that they conjure up of the aftermath. 73
Some perpetrators were charged under the federal Fair Housing Act for
interfering with individuals' housing rights.74 The record in many cross
burning cases prosecuted under the Fair Housing Act makes clear that
crosses were burned to threaten and drive out Black families who were
living in white neighborhoods.75
The history of the use of the cross as a weapon by Klan members
and others opposed to racial integration of white neighborhoods suggests
that the burning cross is viewed as a symbol of violence in the overwhelm-
ing majority of situations in which it is used. The combination of the Klan's
violent history of threatening minorities and the contemporary use of the
burning cross by those who oppose the integration of white neighborhoods
should lead us to the conclusion that cross burning is an act of terror.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., HIRSH, supra note 60, at 97-98 (1983) (describing police in Chicago who
were sympathetic to anti-integrationist protestors); STEPHEN MEYER, As LONG As THEY
DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGH-
BORHOODS 132 (2000) (asserting that acts of terrorism aimed at minorities that were inte-
grating had "broad support among officials including peace officers and others charged
with protecting citizens"); Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 339-40 (contending that
local and state police as well as other law enforcement officers have displayed a pattern of
minimal law enforcement in cases involving housing related crimes committed against
minorities).
13 Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 385.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Hartbartger, 148 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v.
J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993).
75 See Hartbartger, 148 F.3d 777 (cross burned to force biracial couple to move from
trailer park); United States v. Smith, 161 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1998) (cross burned to frighten
biracial couple so they would move from the area); United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918
(11th Cir. 1995) (cross burned on lawn of Black family because perpetrators wanted to
communicate that they "were not wanted" in the all-white neighborhood); J.H.H., 22 F.3d
821 (cross burned because burner was disgusted at having an African American family
living in the neighborhood); United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1994)
(cross burned to drive out shelter for homeless Black veterans); United States v. Lee, 6
F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (cross burned to "scare off' African Americans); United States v.
Long, 935 F.2d 1207 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (cross burned on lawn of Black family in formerly
all-white neighborhood to intimidate them because of their race).
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D. Cross Burning vs. Flag Burning
Because of its history and contemporary use, cross burning will rarely
fail to be interpreted as a symbol of intimidation. This consistency of
meaning attributable to the burning cross contrasts sharply with the dis-
parate meanings attributable to the burning flag, another symbol that has
received repeated attention in First Amendment jurisprudence. A flag that
been set on fire possesses a different meaning for protestors opposed to
U.S. government policy, for example, than it does for many war veterans.
The Supreme Court confronted the conflict between these two interpretive
communities in Texas v. Johnson.76 Johnson reexamined Gerry Lee John-
son's conviction under a Texas law that criminalized intentionally dese-
crating a state or national flag. Johnson set fire to an American flag as
part of a political demonstration. In its decision, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that the myriad possible interpretations of Johnson's actions.
Johnson construed his actions as a legitimate form of political protest.77
The state maintained that Johnson's actions were punishable because
they caused offense that had the potential to result in a breach of the
peace, and because they cast doubt on the idea of nationhood and na-
tional unity.7"
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged these different meanings
of the protest in its decision, one interpretation was privileged. Even
though the act of burning a flag may be offensive to one interpretive com-
munity (many veterans and patriots), the Court reiterated that the First
Amendment prevents the government from crafting legislation aimed at
suppressing such expression. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the ex-
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable."79 The Court held that it was not consistent with the First
Amendment to allow the state to foster its own view of the flag by pro-
hibiting expressive conduct counter to that view.80
The Court's decision in Johnson, as in all First Amendment cases,
had powerful implications for the relative power of different actors in
debate. The Court is often quite careful not to sanction a particular view-
point. Nevertheless by recognizing particular expression as "political"
76491 U.S. 397 (1989).
" Johnson's protest was conducted in Dallas while the Republican National Conven-
tion was taking place. The demonstration was designed to protest the policies of the
Reagan administration and several Dallas-based corporations. Of the protest, Johnson said,
"The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President.
And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech ... couldn't have been made at that
time." Id. at 406.
78 Id. at 401.
79 Id. at 414.
80 d. at 415.
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and preventing its legal suppression the Court legitimates the interpretive
communities that hold that view."
The myriad interpretations of a flag-as vehicle for protest or sacred
sign of national unity-contrast sharply with the single meaning that a
burning cross has for the vast majority of Americans. Those who revere
that flag and are offended by its desecration not only have different reac-
tions to seeing a burning flag than those who might burn one in protest,
they interpret what a burning flag means in such a different way that other
meanings, those of protestors, for example, may be hidden from them.
By contrast, the burning cross does not have such a flexible meaning. Its
use in this country, as the Article details below, has created a single
meaning, as a threat of violence, which is shared by the vast majority of
users and viewers alike.
II. CROSS BURNING AS PROTECTED SPEECH
States have taken a variety of approaches to the problem of cross
burning. In the 1950s, largely in response to cross burning by the Ku Klux
Klan, several states passed statutes explicitly penalizing cross burning.
Generally, the statutes that penalize cross burning specifically do so as
part of a law that criminalizes the placement of crosses, other religious
symbols, and Nazi swastikas when aimed at individuals in a manner that
is intimidating or terrorizing.12 Other states penalize cross burning under
statutes that prohibit malicious intimidation, terrorism, or harassment. 3
Some state statutes that generally prohibit malicious harassment list cross
burning as a particular action prohibited by the statute. 84 If the state does
have a statute that penalizes cross burning by name, the level of intent
that the statute requires varies depending on what type of action it crimi-
nalizes. A few states have created strict-liability cross-burning statutes.
Such statutes prohibit the placement of a burning cross in a public place
or on the private property of another without obtaining consent, regard-
less of the perpetrator's intent.85 So long as the perpetrator has burned the
cross in a public place or without permission of the property owner, he or
she is guilty of violating this type of statute. Frequently, violations of
these types of statutes are misdemeanors.
S The litigants themselves may feel that the courts' decisions have legitimated their
points of view. Recall the skinhead celebration, described supra text accompanying note
11, after the St. Paul statute was struck down in R.A.V
82See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411 (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312.02
(2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1456 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1975).
81 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (2003);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (2000).
8 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-5-221 (Michie 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221
(2003).
85 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-58 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 805 (2001);
FLA. STAT. 876.18 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12 (2003).
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Other state statutes, like the Virginia statute at issue in Virginia v. Black,
require the perpetrator to evince a particular degree of intent when he or
she engages in the cross burning.16 Such statutes generally prohibit cross
burning when it is done with the intent to intimidate, harass, or threaten.87
In most cases, these statutes require that a perpetrator possess the intent
to intimidate the victim of the cross burning.88 Statutes that delineate
what it means to intimidate or terrorize have defined it as causing a per-
son to fear for his or her personal safety.8 9 Violations of this type of stat-
ute are often felonies.
A. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul was the first case to come before the Su-
preme Court involving a challenge to a conviction for cross burning. In
R.A.V, Robert A. Viktora90 was charged under the only misdemeanor statute
available, the one-year-old St. Paul Bias-Motive Ordinance, for having
burned a cross on the Joneses' lawn. 91 The ordinance prohibited the place-
ment of "any object, such as burning cross or swastika, that one has rea-
son to know arouses anger or alarm in others on the basis of race, color,
creed or gender."9 " Viktora challenged his conviction on the grounds that
the St. Paul ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly
content-based, and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment.
86 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
87 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411 (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312.02(a)(3)
(2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (2003); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-10 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-19B-1 (Michie 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1456 (1989).
88 Cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411 (West 2000). California's statute, which prohibits
burning or desecration of a cross or other religious symbol with intent to terrorize, is un-
usual in that it explicitly states that "reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing" meets the
statutory test for liability, so long as the perpetrator intentionally burned the cross. Id.
89 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1141 l(d) (West 2000); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312.02
(2001).
90 Because Viktora was seventeen years old when he was arrested and charged with
violating the St. Paul statute, court documents referred to him as R.A.V. His actual name is
used in this Article because he is no longer a minor and his name has been used in several
published articles. See, e.g., Michael Degan, Adding the First Amendment to the Fire:
Cross Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1993); Cedric
Merlin Powell, The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12
HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 48 (1995); Fredrick Lawrence, Enforcing Bias Crime Laws
without Bias: Evaluating the Disproportionate Enforcement Critique, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 49, 53 (2003).
9' Tom Foley, the prosecutor in the case, argued that his office could not have used
other criminal laws, like trespass, vandalism, or arson, because some of the statutory ele-
ments of those crimes were missing. He decided against charging the three juveniles in-
volved in the cross burning under the state's terroristic threats statute because the adult in-
volved in the cross burning pled guilty to a misdemeanor. Laura J. Lederer, The Prosecu-
tor's Dilemma: An Interview with Tom Foley, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST
RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 195 (Laura Lederer & Richard
Delgado eds., 1995) [hereinafter Lederer, Prosecutor's Dilemma].92ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claims, holding
that the ordinance prohibited only unprotected "fighting words" and did
not prohibit any protected speech. 93 The court concluded that the ordinance
was not impermissibly content-based because it was a narrowly tailored
way of accomplishing a compelling government interest-protecting the
community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order.94
The Supreme Court reversed Viktora's conviction. 95 Although Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, expressed disapproval of Viktora's action
at the end of his opinion, 96 the rest of the opinion reads as a sharp rebuke
of St. Paul's attempt to craft a response to cross burning. The Court re-
jected the city's argument that it had a right specifically to regulate fighting
words that provoked violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender. One reason the Court may have been able to reject St. Paul's
argument so easily was because Justice Scalia chose to ignore the situ-
ational context of the skinheads' actions-which were by the skinheads'
own admissions designed to drive the Joneses out of the neighborhood.
Instead of approaching the regulation of cross burning as a threat, Scalia
approached it somewhat more innocuously, as a message of racial ha-
tred-just another viewpoint along the spectrum of possible perspectives.
Thus, in passing a statute which named the particular ills it was trying to
address, the city, according the Court, was trying to suppress the message
inherent in these words, or symbols. The Court held that St. Paul had
impermissibly "imposed special prohibitions on those speakers who ex-
press views on disfavored subjects."97 According to the Court, singling
out particular fighting words on the basis of race, color, creed, religion,
or gender constituted content-based discrimination in violation of the
First Amendment.
Even if a statute is a content-based regulation of speech, Scalia noted
that it may be deemed constitutional so long as it fits into one of three
exceptions to the general prohibition on content-based regulation. The
first exception provided by the Court is "[w]hen the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech
at issue is proscribable. 98 The government may also engage in content-
based regulation of speech when the apparently content-based statute has
content-neutral intentions, because the statute aims at the "'secondary
effects' of the targeted speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without
reference to the content of the ... speech."' 99 Finally, the Court will per-
93 1n re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
94 Id.
95 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
96See id. at 396 ("Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in
someone's front yard is reprehensible.").
971 d. at 391.
91 Id. at 387.
99 Id. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playmate Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
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mit content-based regulation of expression when "there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."'t
The Court found that the St. Paul statute did not fit into any of these
exceptions. Justice Scalia wrote that by regulating cross burning, St. Paul
had not selected a group of fighting words that are communicated using
an especially offensive mode of expression. The Court also rejected the
city's argument that the ordinance was intended to protect against the secon-
dary effects of bias-motivated violence-the victimization of vulnerable
groups. Justice Scalia maintained that the St. Paul ordinance was directed
not at the secondary effects of the speech but rather to its primary ef-
fect-the emotive impact of the speech on its intended audience.' 0' Fi-
nally, according to Justice Scalia, it was abundantly clear from the city's
statements that the ordinance did not fall into the general exception per-
mitting selectivity when there is no indication that the ordinance is
prompted by the official suppression of ideas.0 2
In R.A.V the Court substantially limited St. Paul's ability to regulate
bias-motivated behavior, even behavior as egregious as the harassment
experienced by the Joneses. 03 The actions of the skinheads were part of a
decades-long pattern of intimidation of minorities in white neighbor-
hoods. In balancing the need of the state to combat group hatred with the
interest of the skinheads in expressing their message, the Court decried
the use of content-specific measures to address anti-integrationist speech.
"The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be
expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech."' ' The Court held
that while the ordinance was created to serve a compelling interest, it was
not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 05 According to the Court,
content-based discrimination was not required to serve the city's interest,
because "[a]n ordinance not limited to the favorite topics ... would have
precisely the same beneficial effect."'0 6
B. State Court Interpretations of R.A.V.
The decision in R.A. V became something of a moving target, leading
state courts and commentators to interpret the decision in myriad ways.
00Id. at 390.
10 Id. at 394.
102 Id. at 395.
103 Akhil Amar has noted the irony in the fact that when discussing the types of speech
that a government may regulate because of secondary effects, Justice Scalia cites federal
housing statutes prohibiting discrimination in housing. Amar comments that perhaps Jus-
tice Scalia does not realize that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 would prohibit speech like the words,
"No Blacks Allowed" on a For Sale sign. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing
Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 129 (1992).
I(' R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 392.
1o See id. at 395-96.
106 Id. at 396.
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Perhaps because in R.A.V the Supreme Court was limited to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's construction of the St. Paul ordinance as address-
ing fighting words, scholars have frequently considered R.A.V a hate
speech case.0 7 Although the Supreme Court had devoted little, if any,
space to defining cross burning as protected expression, many state courts
interpreted the decision in R.A.V as holding cross burning categorically
protected by the First Amendment. Soon after R.A. V was decided, several
state statutes aimed at cross burning were challenged on First Amendment
grounds. 8 Although state court judges have paid lip service to the his-
torical legacy of cross burning, they have ignored the threat inherent in
burning a cross and have consequently struck down cross-burning statutes.
State v. Talley'0 9 serves as an excellent example of a state court's be-
lief that R.A.V categorically protected cross burning. Three separate cross-
burning cases were joined at the appellate stage to address the constitution-
ality of Washington's malicious harassment statute. Talley, one of three
respondents along with Myers and Stevens, burned a four-foot-tall cross
on his own lawn in the presence of a mixed-race family, the Smiths, who
were planning to move in next door."' He had previously complained that
"having niggers next door" would ruin his property value."' Once the
cross was burning, Talley, who had a clean-shaven head and was wearing
fatigues, combat boots, and a Harley-Davidson T-shirt, began to "hoot
and holler."" 2
Talley was charged under Washington's malicious harassment stat-
ute, section 9A.36.080 of the Washington Code." 3 The first section of the
107 See, e.g., Robert J. Corry, Jr., Burn This Article: It is Evidence in Your Thought
Crime Prosecution, 4 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 461, 478-80 (2000); Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and
Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 333, 353 (1991); Mar-
tin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing
Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29 (1992).
108 See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993); State v. Ramsey, 430 S.E.2d
511 (S.C. 1993); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
109 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
"
0 Id. at 220.
I Id.
112 Id. When Mrs. Smith asked if there was a problem, he responded that he didn't talk
to her "kind" and ordered her off his property. The Smiths were frightened and decided not
to finalize their purchase of the property. Id.
"I Section 9A.36.080 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and inten-
tionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the
victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
or mental, physical, or sensory handicap:
(a) Causes physical injury to the victim or another person;
(b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or
another person; or
(c) Threatens a specific person or group of persons and places that person, or
members of the specific group of persons, in reasonable fear of harm to person or
property. The fear must be a fear that a reasonable person would have under all
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statute states that a person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she
behaves with intent to intimidate a person because of his or her race, color,
religion, and history, national origin, or mental, physical or sensory handi-
cap. 114 In order to violate the statute, the perpetrator must either cause
physical injury, cause property damage, or use words or conduct that place
the victims in reasonable fear of harm to their person or property." 5 The
second section provides that the burning of a cross on an African Ameri-
can victim's property or the defacing of a Jewish victim's property with a
swastika raise an inference that the malicious harassment statute has been
violated." 1
6
The respondents challenged the statute on three grounds. First, they
argued that it was unconstitutional because it directly regulated the com-
municative impact of the speech. They also contended that the statute as
a whole was overbroad because legitimate protected speech was encom-
passed within the statute's ambit and that the statute chilled free speech.
Finally, respondent Stevens maintained that the first section of the statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause and was impermissibly vague." 17
With respect to the first section of the statute, which prohibited ma-
licious harassment with intent to intimidate because of race, color, relig-
ion, or other categories, the Washington Supreme Court found little similar-
ity between the St. Paul ordinance considered in R.A.V and the Wash-
the circumstances. For purposes of this section, a "reasonable person" is a reason-
able person who is a member of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, na-
tional origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or who has the same mental, physical,
or sensory handicap as the victim. Words alone do not constitute malicious har-
assment unless the context or circumstances surrounding the words indicate the
words are a threat. Threatening words do not constitute malicious harassment if it
is apparent to the victim that the person does not have the ability to carry out the
threat.
(2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which ex-
plains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten
the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to
threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception
of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits
one of the following acts:
(a) Burns a cross on property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives
to be of African American heritage; or
(b) Defaces property of a victim who is or whom the actor perceives to be of
Jewish heritage by defacing the property with a swastika.
This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for eviden-
tiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a
person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do
not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West 2000).
114 Id. § 9A.36.080(1).
1 5 Id. § 9A.36.080(l)(b).
1 6 Id. § 9A.36.080(2)(a).
117 Talley, 858 P.2d at 221.
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ington statute. Judge Madsen, who wrote the majority opinion in Talley,
insisted that because the Washington statute regulated the perpetrator's se-
lection of a victim, the statute was aimed at criminal conduct, not speech." 8
The court found further evidence that the statute punished conduct in the
fact that the legislature took care to specify that speech does not consti-
tute malicious harassment unless it causes fear of harm."'9
The second section of the statute, which explicitly prohibited cross
burning, did not fare as well as the first, largely because the court be-
lieved that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V governed. Despite
its earlier pronouncement of facial dissimilarity between the two statutes,
the court recognized that both the St. Paul ordinance and section 2(a) of
the Washington statute prohibited cross burning. In the eyes of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, because the state legislature had intended to pun-
ish cross burning, the statute was aimed at punishing speech because of
its offensive message. 2 ° With little other explanation save a citation to
R.A.V, the court found that the statute was punishing symbolic hate speech
and was therefore unconstitutional. The Washington Supreme Court thus
struck down the cross burning portion of the statute. 2'
The approach taken by state courts in Maryland, New Jersey, and
South Carolina that similarly struck down their states' cross burning stat-
utes after R.A.V suggests that courts understood R.A.V to have declared
cross burning categorically protected. As RA.V has been interpreted by
courts, the clearer and more odious the message of violence and bigotry,
the greater cross burners' needs for First Amendment protection. For in-
stance, in striking down Sections 10 and 11 of New Jersey's hate crime
statute on First Amendment grounds, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
When a person places a Nazi swastika on a synagogue or burns
a cross in an African-American family's yard, the message
sought to be conveyed is clear: by painting the swastika or by
burning the cross, a person intends to express hatred, hostility,
and animosity toward Jews or toward African-Americans ....
Such messages are not only offensive and contemptible, they are
all too easily understood .... In fact, the sort of conduct regu-
lated by Sections 10 and 11 is a successful, albeit a reprehensi-
ble, vehicle for communication .... [T]hey address conduct
that is heavily laden with an unmistakable message. Those sec-
1 I8 ld. at 222.
119 Id. at 226-27 ("The express language of subsection (1)(b) protects such discrimi-
natory ideas and philosophies where they are not combined with criminal acts.").
120 1d. at 231.
121 Id. at 230.
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tions therefore regulate speech for purposes of the First Amend-
ment.
22
The concern courts have shown for extending First Amendment pro-
tection to cross burners is often supported by evidence of legislative and
executive disapproval of cross burners' ideas. In some cases, the legisla-
tive history of the statute provides evidence to the court that the statute
was intended to suppress cross burners' speech. For example, the New
Jersey governor's remarks, combined with the location in which the
state's hate crime statute was signed, signaled to the New Jersey Supreme
Court that the statute was a content-based regulation of expressive con-
duct. 123 In both State v. Vawter, the case striking down New Jersey's cross
burning statute, and State v. Sheldon,124 the case striking down Mary-
land's cross burning statute, the presence of cross burning statutes when
alternate schemes existed to address fires was seen as a sign of legislative
disagreement with the ideas expressed by the cross burners. 25
C. The Inadequacy of State Court Interpretations
As the history in Part I, supra, suggests, for a state court to view
cross burning as run-of-the-mill political speech requires blindness to
history and to the context in which many cross burnings occur. This
blindness to history was evident in State v. Sheldon,126 the Maryland case
that overturned that state's cross burning statute on First Amendment
grounds. In Sheldon, the court considered appeals by two defendants who
had been convicted under the state's hate crime statute for burning crosses.
The first defendant had burned a cross on public property; the other, on
the lawn of two Black families. Both were charged under Maryland's cross
burning statute, which required individuals wishing to burn crosses or
other religious symbols to: (1) secure the permission of the property
owner where the burning, is to occur; and (2) notify the local fire depart-
ment prior to engaging in the burning. 27
The Maryland Court of Appeals interpreted the statute as a content-
based regulation of speech. The opinion by Judge Murphy typifies a court's
failure to interpret the statute in light of the situational context in which
cross burnings occur. Although the court acknowledged the historical legacy
of cross burning, Judge Murphy did not discuss the terror that cross burning
inspires in those at whom it is directed. The history of cross burning was
relevant only in defining the action as expressive.
112 State v. Vawter, 642 A.2d 349, 354-55 (N.J. 1994).
23 Id. at 356.
124 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993).
"z See id. at 759-60; Vawter, 642 A.2d at 356.
126 Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753.
127 Id. at 755-56.
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The open and deliberate burning of religious symbols is, need-
less to say, odious to thoughtful members of our society. Such
acts, which allow the cowardly to avoid articulating and de-
fending their irrational beliefs, display contempt for the targeted
religious groups and, when crosses are burned, for blacks in
particular. The hostility which surrounds these acts makes it im-
perative, therefore, for us to remain mindful of a most important
axiom in assessing the constitutionality of Maryland's cross
burning statute: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." '128
Although it described cross burning as a "cowardly" act that substitutes
for the articulation and defense of "irrational beliefs," the court did not
consider cross burning to be a threat, but rather described it merely as a
way of displaying contempt toward minorities.
The court offered two reasons that the statute was impermissible un-
der the First Amendment. The first sign to the court that the statute was
content-based came from the fact that the cross burning statute added little
to Maryland's existing scheme for the punishment of fire-related offenses.
The court also suggested that the legislative history revealed the legisla-
ture's disagreement with the expressive message sent by cross burning. 129
After finding the statute content-based, the court in Sheldon consid-
ered whether it could, as the state had argued, be justified under the ex-
ceptions for regulations aimed at secondary effects caused by the speech.
The state argued in particular that the statute was aimed at the damage to
property that cross burning causes. 30
In its response to the state's secondary effects argument, the court
seemed to suggest that the legislature was unable to craft a constitutional
statute aimed specifically at the act of burning a cross, given that it had
an existing scheme for fire protection. The failure of the cross burning
law to provide benefits beyond those offered by other, more general pro-
hibitions on setting fire to property led the court to conclude that the cross
burning statute was targeted at the primary effect of the speech. "[T]he
State aimed plainly at the 'primary effect' of the cross burning, that is,
the political idea it expresses."''
In deciding that the secondary effects exception was inapplicable,
the court ignored the history of cross burning and the terror burning crosses
have inspired. The court distinguished cross burning from the nude
128 Id. at 757 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
129 Id. at 759-60.
130 Id. at 761-62.
131 Id. at 761.
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dancing that had been at issue in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,3 ' which
the Supreme Court had held could be regulated because of its discernible
secondary effects. In the court's eyes, cross burning was just another fire.
As such, it was viewed as less damaging than the prostitution and other
crime allegedly spawned by the nude dancing. "Here, by contrast, there
is nothing particularly unique or dangerous in the act of burning a re-
ligious symbol relative to other kinds of open fires which justifies special
precautions for the former."'33
Once the Maryland court was satisfied that the statute was content-
based and that it did not fall into any of the exceptions to First Amend-
ment protection, it used strict scrutiny to evaluate the statute. The court
rejected the state's argument that it had a compelling interest in protect-
ing the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and
order:
[T]he Constitution does not allow the unnecessary trammeling
of free expression for even the noblest of purposes .... Mary-
land's cross burning law simply cannot be deemed "necessary"
to the State's effort to foster racial and religious accord .... [I]t
is safe to say that the cross burning statute, which merely in-
conveniences a tiny handful of individuals who would openly
burn religious symbols, will not prove indispensable to the en-
deavor for justice.134
Similar to St. Paul's limited prohibition on the use of particular types of
symbols, the Maryland statute's failure to prohibit all cross burnings was
a detriment. The fact that individuals could burn crosses if they notified
the local fire department and secured the permission of the owner indi-
cated to the court that the statute did not effectively regulate its intended
ill, bias-motivated threats.'35 Thus, the Maryland Supreme Court struck
down the statute.
In short, R.A. V sparked a dramatic change in state courts' approaches to
bias-motivated conduct in the form of cross burning. Relying on R.A.V,
state courts invalidated not only state cross-burning statutes but also, in
some cases, bias-motivated violence and intimidation statutes because state
judges and justices interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in R.A. V to
establish cross burning as protected symbolic conduct. As Virginia v.
32 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (permitting the regulation of
adult theaters because of the "secondary effects" that such establishments could have on a
neighborhood, such as attracting prostitution and other crime).
' Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 762 (emphasis added). Though at several points the court in
Sheldon referred to cross burning as the burning of a religious symbol, the burning cross
has been divorced from religious symbolism. See WADE, supra note 40.
'3 Sheldon, 629 A.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
135 Id.
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Black136 indicates, the perspective taken by those state courts is not man-
dated by the text of R.A. V
III. VIRGINA V. BLACK AND THE MYTH OF THE INNOCENT
CROSS BURNING
Eleven years after its decision in R.A.V., the Supreme Court again
examined the constitutionality of a statute regulating cross burning in
Virginia v. Black.'37 Although Black was the Supreme Court's second ex-
amination of the First Amendment protection for cross burning, there
was an important restriction in R.A.V that did not apply in Black. In
R.A.V the Court was limited to the Minnesota Supreme Court's construc-
tion of cross burning as "fighting words."'3 a Therefore, in R.A.V there
was little examination of why the act of burning a cross constituted sym-
bolic expression. There was no such limitation in Black, so the Court was
free to examine the contours of the activity in which the defendants burned
crosses.
Black was an appeal by the Commonwealth of Virginia from a deci-
sion of the Virginia Supreme Court. 139 Respondents Barry Black, Richard
Elliott, and Jonathan O'Mara were each convicted under Virginia's cross-
burning statute, which prohibited the burning of a cross on the property
of another or in a public place with the intent to intimidate. 140 The statute
also made any cross burning prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.' 4 1
A. A Klan Rally, Retaliation Against a Black Neighbor
The defendants who appealed their convictions under the Virginia stat-
ute burned crosses in very different circumstances. Barry Black was charged
under Virginia's cross-burning statute after having presided over a Ku
Klux Klan rally in Carroll County, Virginia during which a cross was
burned. The rally occurred on a private field located near a highway with
the permission of the owner. 42 A white witness, Rebecca Sechrist, who
136 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
137 Id.
131 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
'39 Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001).
140 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1541. The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property
of another, or highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a class 6 felony.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (Michie 1996).
"41 The provision provided that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evi-
dence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons." Id. § 18.2-423.
'42 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542.
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lived next door to the property testified that during the rally, in addition
to disparaging Blacks and Mexicans, one Klan member told the group,
"he would love to take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the [Bjlacks."'"
Sechrist testified that she felt frightened. At the end of the rally, Klan
members burned the twenty-five- to thirty-foot-tall cross. According to a
local deputy sheriff present at the rally, the cross was visible along a three-
quarter-mile stretch of state highway. He noted that one Black family driv-
ing down the highway stopped, saw the burning cross, and then "took off
at a higher than normal rate of speed."" After the cross was burned, the
sheriff arrested Black, who indicated that he was responsible for the
burning.
At Black's trial, the jury was instructed that intent to intimidate
meant "the motivation to intentionally put a person or a group of persons
in fear of bodily harm."'45 However, the jury was not specifically required
to examine whether that definition had been satisfied in Black's case, for
it was also advised that the burning of a cross by itself was "sufficient
evidence from which [it could] infer intent."'' 46 Black was convicted and
his conviction was affirmed by the Virginia Court of Appeals.
Richard Elliott and Jonathan O'Mara were convicted for burning a
cross in the yard of James Jubilee, an African American who lived next
door to Elliott. According to the record in the case, unlike Black, Elliott
and O'Mara were not affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan but rather burned
a cross in retaliation for Jubilee's complaints about their backyard firing
range. The remnants of the burning cross, which Jubilee discovered the
next morning only twenty feet from his house, made Jubilee very nerv-
ous. The cross burning fit into a familiar pattern: African American in-
migration followed by violence. Jubilee and his family had moved to
Virginia Beach from California just four months prior to the cross burn-
ing. Jubilee testified he was nervous because he "didn't know what would
be the next phase .... [A] cross burned in your yard . .. tells you that
it's just the first round."'47
Unlike Black's trial, where the jury was allowed to infer intent to
intimidate from the burning of a cross, at Elliott's trial, the jury was in-
structed that the Commonwealth was required to prove "the defendant
had the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.' 1 48 The court
did not supply an instruction on what it meant by intent to intimidate, nor
was the jury instructed on the prima facie evidence provision. Elliott was
found guilty of attempted cross burning. The Virginia Court of Appeals
affirmed the convictions of both Elliott and O'Mara.
143 Id.
'"4 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
14 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542.
1 Id.
t47 Id. at 1543 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Id.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia accepted the Petitioners' argument
that the Virginia cross burning law was facially unconstitutional.14 9 Like
state courts in New Jersey and Washington, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia saw clear similarities between Virginia's cross-burning statute and
the one at issue in R.A.V v. St. Paul. Calling the statute "analytically in-
distinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in R.A.V," the
Virginia Supreme Court maintained that by enacting the statute the Com-
monwealth had discriminated based on the content of the message that
cross burners were trying to communicate. 50
Although the Virginia statute, unlike the statute at issue in R.A.V., made
no reference to race, the court said that the absence of such language did not
mean that the state had not wished to proscribe the message of racial ha-
tred that cross burning generally communicates. 5 The Virginia court drew
evidence of the Commonwealth's intent to discriminate against the message
conveyed by cross burning from the historical and contemporary context
of cross burning, and from the state's reliance on that context in the sec-
tion of the statute that made cross burning prima facie evidence of intent
to intimidate. 5 The court relied on the historical context for the passage
of the Virginia cross-burning statute, stating that, "[iln an atmosphere of
racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, the General Assembly acted to
combat a particular form of intimidating symbolic speech-the burning
of a cross."'53 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because the legisla-
tion was aimed at the action of cross burning, which had been acknowl-
edged in a variety of court opinions as a powerful symbol, the court as-
sumed that the legislature had intended to discriminate based on content.
After finding that the legislation was content-based, the Virginia Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that the legislation fell into one of the
exceptions to the general prohibition against content-based legislation
outlined in R.A.V The legislation was not, it found, aimed at the secon-
dary effects of cross burning because of the provision allowing prima
facie evidence of intent to intimidate to be drawn from the act of burning
a cross. In the court's eyes, this particular section of the statute indicated
119 Black, S.E.2d at 746.
150 Id. at 742, 743-44.
'"I The Virginia Supreme Court cited United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990),
as evidence that the legislature intended to discriminate against cross burners' messages
even without any language in the statute to this effect. Eichman examined the constitution-
ality of the Flag Protection Act of 1989. In defense of the Act, the United States had sug-
gested that the absence of language in the Act addressing the content of speech indicated
that the statute was not content-based. The Virginia Supreme Court noted that in Eichman
the Supreme Court declined to adopt such a rigid textual approach to the government's
motivation, and quoted the Eichman Court as saying that, "[ajlthough the [statute] contains
no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless
clear that the Government's asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expres-
sion." Black, 553 S.E.2d at 744 (quoting Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315) (alteration in original).
512 Black, 553 S.E.2d at 744.
13 Id. at 745.
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that the statute was aimed at regulating content. According to the court,
the prima facie clause also made the statute overbroad. The statute was
therefore struck down and the defendants' convictions were reversed.'54
On appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Commonwealth argued
that the cross-burning statute was a content-neutral manifestation of the
Virginia legislature's desire to promote law and order by preventing a
particularly egregious form of intimidation.'5 5 Pointing to the absence of
evidence regarding legislative purpose, the Commonwealth contested
Black's claim that the legislature had designed the Virginia statute to dis-
criminate on the basis of content. In fact, the Commonwealth used Vir-
ginia's history of racial segregation to suggest that in passing the law the
legislature was not attempting to demonstrate disapproval of white su-
premacy.'56 The Commonwealth outlined a long list of racially discrimi-
natory statutes on the books in 1952 when the cross-burning statute was
first passed.'57 The Commonwealth argued that the presence of these laws,
along with the use of content-neutral language to proscribe cross burning,
were proof that the Virginia statute was intended to reach only constitu-
tionally regulable threats.
In the event that the Supreme Court found the Virginia statute to be
content-based, the Commonwealth argued that the statute still was con-
stitutional because it satisfied each of the exceptions outlined in R.A.V
First, R.A. V allowed content-based regulation of a subclass of expression
within an exception to First Amendment protection, so long as the sub-
class has been singled out for the same reason the entire class of unpro-
tected speech is regulable.' 5' Adopting an argument centered on getting the
Supreme Court to recognize the context of cross burning, the Common-
wealth argued that cross burning could be regulated because it is a par-
ticularly virulent form of intimidation causing a great amount of disrup-
tion and violence.15
9
In addition to being a threat, the Commonwealth argued that cross
burning had secondary effects including creating retaliatory violence,
depressing property values, and "generally transform[ing] our society
into one reminiscent of Northern Ireland or the Balkans."'" Finally, Vir-
154 Id. at 746.
155 Petitioner's Brief at 9-10, 17, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-
1107).
156 Id. at 23-24.
151 Id. at 23 n. 14. The Commonwealth also mentioned the Virginia General Assembly's
massive resistance just two years later to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education as evidence that the cross burning statute was not intended to discriminate
against white supremacist viewpoints. Id. at 23-24.
'
58 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
159 Petitioner's Brief at 37, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
160 Id. at 39.
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ginia argued that the statute satisfied the third exception in R.A.V., be-
cause it banned all cross burning undertaken with intent to intimidate. 6 '
Black countered that by targeting a specific symbol, the burning cross,
the Virginia statute constituted content-based discrimination. Lawyers for
Black maintained that neither the absence of legislative history showing
the, Commonwealth's ulterior motive, nor the fact that the statute required
intent to intimidate cured the statute's content and viewpoint discrimina-
tion. 1612 Moreover, Black's lawyer claimed that the fact that Virginia's law
reached all cross burnings committed with the purpose of intimidating did
not lessen the statute's viewpoint discrimination. 163 Black's counsel insisted
that, by singling out cross burning, the Commonwealth of Virginia had
interfered with citizens' constitutionally protected right to use whatever
symbols they wished to communicate. "Americans have the right to use
symbols freely to communicate, to wave flags or trample on them, to
worship crosses or to burn them."' 6
The hardest issue for Black was whether the Commonwealth could
regulate cross burning as a threat. Lawyers for Black contended that cross
burning cannot be regulated as threatening behavior because some cross
burnings constitute "abstract advocacy" or "violent rhetoric" protected from
First Amendment regulation rather than actual lawless action, which re-
mains unprotected. 65 Black argued that the prima facie evidence provi-
sion in the Virginia statute, which made no distinction between cross
burnings that do not incite lawless action and those that do, therefore
violated the distinction between abstract advocacy and lawless action
established in cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio,"6 Watts v. United States,161
and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.68
B. The Supreme Court's (Limited) Appreciation of the Historical Context
of Cross Burning
Both in the oral argument and in the opinion in Black, the Supreme
Court seemed to take a different approach to the First Amendment impli-
cations of cross burning than it had in R.A. V. The case received significant
media attention when Justice Thomas, the Court's only African American
member, a Justice who frequently sides with the most conservative mem-
bers of the Court, rebuked a member of the Solicitor General's office for
161 Id. at 40.
162 Respondent's Brief at 11, 19, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-
1107).
"
3 Id. at 15.
164Id.
65 Id. at 42-43.
1- 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
167 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
168 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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understating the effect of cross burning during oral argument.' 69 Deputy
Solicitor General Michael Dreeben was arguing for the Government on
behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The exchange came as a sur-
prise not only because of his conservative politics but also because Jus-
tice Thomas had written an opinion maintaining that the Klan's erection
of a cross in a public forum was a political act.'10
QUESTION [Thomas]: Mr. Dreeben, aren't you understating the-
the effects of-of the burning cross? This statute was passed in
what year?
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.
QUESTION [Thomas]: Now, it's my understanding that we had
almost 100 years of lynching and activity in the South by the
Knights of Camellia and-and the Ku Klux Klan, and this was a
reign of terror and the cross was a symbol of that reign of terror.
Was-isn't that significantly greater than intimidation or a
threat?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they're coextensive, Justice Tho-
mas, because it is-
QUESTION [Thomas]: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you're
actually understating the symbolism on-of and the effect of the
cross, the burning cross. I-I indicated, I think, in the Ohio case
that the cross was not a religious symbol and that it has-it was
intended to have a virulent effect. And I-I think that what
you're attempting to do is to fit this into our jurisprudence rather
than stating more clearly what the cross was intended to accom-
plish and, indeed, that it is unlike any symbol in our society.' 7'
Justice Thomas's comments reflected a clear appreciation of the role that
cross burning has played in American history. The terror that cross
burning inflicts on African Americans was also recognized in the major-
ity opinion authored by Justice O'Connor. In sharp contrast to the Court's
brief discussion of the cross burning in R.A.V, 17 the Court in Black sup-
169 See Joan Biskupic, Cross-Burning Case Agitates Thomas, USA TODAY, Dec. 12,
2002, at 3A; Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at Al; Justice Thomas Speaks Out-Against Free Speech,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 2002, at A52, available at 2002 WL 103518284; Dahlia Lithwick,
Editorial, Personal Truths and Legal Fictions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35.
170 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770-72 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
17' Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003)
(No. 01-1107).
172 Justice Scalia's bare-bones statement of the facts in R.A.V is just two sentences
long. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992). For comment on Scalia's
brevity in discussing the impact of this cross burning on the Jones family, see Charles R.
Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the
First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (1992) [hereinafter Lawrence, Cross-
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plied an extended, vivid description of the cross burnings. 173 This lengthy
description of the cross burnings was followed by a long section primar-
ily focused on contextualizing cross burning by examining the develop-
ment of the Ku Klux Klan and its use of the burning cross as an instru-
ment of terror. The burning cross, the Court asserted, was a "symbol of
hate" that may be designed to communicate a message of intimidation
aimed at inspiring fear of bodily harm.1 74 This message, the Court insisted,
is a threatening one:
The person who burns a cross directed at a particular person often
is making a serious threat, meant to coerce the victim to comply
with the Klan's wishes unless the victim is willing to risk the
wrath of the Klan.175
Justice Thomas's comments during oral argument highlighting the terror
that cross burning inspires among African Americans readied the stage
for Justice O'Connor's extended description of the historical context of
cross burning. Some have argued that Justice Thomas's comments signifi-
cantly affected the other Justices.'76 Unlike so many state cross burning
opinions which discounted the legacy of cross burning, in Black the ma-
jority opinion confronted the issue head-on.
C. Punishing Intimidation and Protecting "Innocent" Cross Burnings
Beginning the opinion with a long description of the historical use of
cross burning by the Klan and a vivid picture of the intimidating nature
of the burning cross left Justice O'Connor in an interesting doctrinal place.
In Black the Court chose to walk the fine line between regulating all
cross burnings and punishing only a select few. The Court was willing to
acknowledge the fear caused by cross burning when intimidation was
intended. At the same time, the Court held that the Constitution did not
permit individuals to be penalized for burning crosses without intent to
cause fear.
The opinion in Black contains two sets of categorizations with re-
spect to cross burning. The first categorization the Court made was to
divide cross burning into two categories, cross burnings in which the
perpetrator intended to intimidate and cross burnings in which the perpe-
trator did not intend to intimidate, a category that Justice Thomas sarcas-
burning and the Sound of Silence].
173 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1542-43 (2003).
14 Id. at 1546.
1
75 Id.
176 See Greenhouse, supra note 169; Guy Uriel-Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burn-
ings, Epistemics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, GEo. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2004).
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tically but usefully designated "innocent" cross burnings in his dissent.'
The Court held that cross burnings in which the perpetrator intended to
intimidate the victim are not deserving of First Amendment protection,
while "innocent" cross burnings are. The second categorization involves
a division of the category of "innocent" cross burning into several types,
including: (1) cross burning used as a statement of ideology; (2) cross
burning used as a symbol of group solidarity, such as a cross burning used at
a Klan gathering or rally;'78 and finally, (3) cross burning used as thea-
ter-cross burning that expresses neither ideology nor intimidation (i.e.,
in movies or plays).'79 With respect to the first two categories of "inno-
cent" cross burning, Justice O'Connor described cross burning as core
political speech.'80
What the Court missed in protecting cross burning not intended to
intimidate is the effect of such cross burnings on African Americans, re-
gardless of the intent of the cross burner. For victims, and those who sym-
pathize with them, there is no other way of viewing cross burning except
as highly threatening. A cross burning by the Klan at one of its gather-
ings, especially a gathering staged in a way that others will see it, is in-
tended to serve two goals at the same time: promoting group solidarity
and causing intimidation. Even cross burning at Klan rallies closed to
outsiders was intended to intimidate. Historically, the Klan held rallies in
places where they could burn crosses on top of tall hills so the burning
cross would be a visible sign of Klan power for miles. The Court seems
to be suggesting that if a cross is burned at a rally or Klan gathering, the
speech and associational rights of the cross burners trump victims' rights
not to be intimidated.
There is a sharp contrast between the Court's recognition of the power
of Klan violence and its accommodation of "innocent" cross burning. The
duality that the opinion presents-recognizing the harm of cross burning
while at the same time preserving the space for "innocent" cross burn-
ing-is an important aspect of the Court's ruling. Because the Court rec-
ognized that "innocent" cross burning is entitled to First Amendment
protection, after Black the only cross burning statutes that do not violate
the Constitution are those that only criminalize cross burnings committed
with the intent to intimidate.
The decision in Black left R.A.V intact. Justice O'Connor wrote that
allowing states to punish cross burners who intend to intimidate stems
from one of the three exceptions to R.A.V-the exception that allows
content-based regulation when the state is attempting to regulate a subset
of messages that may be excluded for the reason the entire category may
177 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1568 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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be prohibited. In Black, the Court noted that the First Amendment would
not have prevented the Commonwealth from prohibiting all intimidating
messages.'"' In light of the history of cross burning as a symbol of vio-
lence, the Commonwealth chose instead to regulate only a particularly
damaging subset of those messages.8 2
Because the Court found that non-intimidating "innocent" cross
burnings are entitled to First Amendment protection, the fact that under
the Virginia statute the act of burning a cross constituted prima facie evi-
dence of intent to intimidate rendered the statute unconstitutional. 8 3 The
Court reasoned that the prima facie provision would permit the convic-
tion of an individual who had burned a cross without requiring an inquiry
into the issue of whether the defendant had intended to intimidate. Jus-
tice O'Connor suggested a parade of horribles that might occur were the
Court to allow states to prohibit all cross burning-the chilling of politi-
cal speech and the conviction of moviemakers and stage production com-
panies." 4
The Virginia statute punished only cross burning performed with an
intent to intimidate. Justice O'Connor reasoned that, because Virginia has
the power to outlaw intimidation or threats under Watts v. United States, 18 5 it
may also outlaw cross burnings committed with the intent to intimidate
under the first R.A.V exception as cross burnings are a particularly viru-
lent form of intimidation.'86
Although Justice O'Connor cited Watts for the proposition above,
rather than using a threat-based analysis that focuses on the perceptions
of the recipient of a threat, the Court adopted an intent-based standard that
focuses on the motivations of the person making the threat. While cross
burning done with the intent to intimidate can be regulated, Justice
O'Connor made clear that the Court's desire was to protect cross burn-
ings that are offensive, though not intimidating. O'Connor chose an in-
teresting example of a cross burning which may be offensive but is not
intimidating: a cross burning in a rally. Her answer to those who might
argue that such displays arouse anger or hatred was that counter-speech
may be the most effective response.87
While Black was clearly more supportive of state efforts to punish
cross burning than R.A.V, looking at the decision closely reveals its limita-
tions, especially given the history of cross burning. The Court's require-
ment that statutes punish only cross burning undertaken with the intent to
"I Id. at 1549.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1550.
184 "Cross burnings have appeared in movies such as Mississippi Burning, and in plays
such as the stage adaptation of Sir Walter Scott's The Lady of the Lake." Id. at 1551.
185 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
i86 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549.
87 See id. at 1551 (quoting Gerald Gunther's admonition to denounce bigots without
legally prohibiting the expression of hateful ideas).
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intimidate fails to recognize fully both the violent intentions and the white
supremacist goals of many cross burners. Distinguishing cross burning with
the intent to intimidate from other types of more "harmless" cross burn-
ings suggests, in a manner removed from history and contemporary social
context, that cross burning is a symbol with myriad interpretations.
Justice O'Connor's acknowledgement of the painful historical legacy
of cross burning seems slightly at odds with the Court's protection of "inno-
cent" cross burning. In light of the terror that the Court recognized that
burning crosses cause, it seems irrational to provide protection for some
cross burning, irrespective of whether or not it was intended to cause ter-
ror. One way to rationalize the Court's desire to provide protection for
individuals wishing to engage in cross burning is the fact that cross burn-
ers in general may be a political minority whom the state often wishes to
silence.' 88 This understanding does not always reflect reality, however,
and at times quite the opposite has been true. The Virginia statute was
originally passed in 1952, in the wake of a rash of cross burnings. 8 9 At
the time, individuals who supported segregation had much of the law on
their side. When the statute was passed, Virginia mandated racial segre-
gation in schools, public accommodations, and transportation.'9 The
cross burning statute was arguably one of a few acts supporting racial
tolerance in the state.
D. The Limitations of Intent to Intimidate-The Joking, Drunken, and
Unaware Cross Burners
The implications of Black for state cross-burning statutes are signifi-
cant. The Court endorsed the creation of a particular type of cross burn-
ing statute, one that recognizes that the cross burner who behaved with an
intent to intimidate can be punished. Despite the history of cross burning
and its contemporary use, the Court's decision in Black holds that a jury
may not infer that the defendant intended to intimidate viewers of the
burning cross solely because the cross has been placed in public view or
on another's private property. In other words, the prosecution must prove
that the defendant intended to intimidate when he or she burned the cross.
Placing on the prosecution the burden of proving that the defendant
intended to intimidate may lead to a variety of troubling results. The first
is that since Klan solidarity is a protected reason to burn a cross, defen-
dants charged with cross burning may safely rely on assertions that that
88 Mari Matsuda and Charles Lawrence recognize this rhetorical reversal in R.A.V,
where "[t]he reality of ongoing racism and exclusion is erased and bigotry is redefined as
majoritarian condemnation of racist views." Mari J. Matsuda & Charles Lawrence III,
Epilogue to WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 135 (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
189 Petitioner's Brief at 22, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
190 Id. at 23-24.
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they burned a cross not to intimidate, but to show their pride in being
Klansmen.
Black may allow defendants to avoid being found guilty of cross burn-
ing as long as they offer some evidence demonstrating that they did not
intend to intimidate. The requirement that cross burners possess the in-
tent to intimidate may therefore create a significant loophole through
which several groups of individuals who have burned crosses may escape
punishment. There have been several cases when individuals have burned
crosses, and later claimed that their behavior was a "prank" or a "joke."'9
A number of cases have involved cross burners who were drunk or high
at the time of the cross burning.'92 Naturally, it is easier for "pranksters"
and those intoxicated at the time of the cross burning to argue that they
had not intended to intimidate when placing the cross.
Although inebriated cross burners may not intend to cause harm, there
are at least two justifications for meting out some punishment to prank-
sters and the intoxicated. The first justification is that the legacy of cross
burning makes the impact of their behavior reasonably foreseeable. Their
punishment may also be justified because similar harm results from
burning the cross regardless of whether they intended to intimidate. Though
the victim later learns the cross burning was just a "joke," when she first
experiences the burning cross she will naturally assume that it was in-
tended as a serious expression of harm and likely will be quite fright-
ened. The stance taken by the Court in Black suggests that even when a
cross burning inspires great terror and fear of bodily harm in victims, it is
not punishable under a cross burning statute if the perpetrator intended
the incident only as a joke.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: twelve-year-old Mi-
chael is white. One of his classmates is Stephen, who is Black and who
often visits his grandmother, who lives in a small, all-Black neighbor-
hood near Michael. The neighborhood has a high concentration of elderly
individuals who remember from their youth violence following cross burn-
'91 See, e.g., Newton v. Dep't of Air Force, 85 F.3d 595, 597 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (appellant
claimed burning cross displayed in African American's co-worker's work area was a joke);
Police Officers for Equal Rights v. Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 402 (S.D. Ohio 1985)
(wearing of white sheets and burning of cross as a "joke"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Browning,
598 F. Supp. 421, 493 (D. Or. 1983) (cross burner alleged action was "prank"); United
States v. Hooper, 4 M.J. 830, 831 (A.F.C.M.R. 1978) (cross burners approach cross burned
on military base as joke); In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(cross burned as a Friday-the-13th joke); Garrison v. Conklin, No. 234243, 2003 WL 356660
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2003) (cross burning alleged as part of a Halloween prank).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001) (cross burner
drank heavily and took prescription pain medication); United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d
1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 2000) (cross burners "drinking heavily" prior to cross burning);
United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1994) (cross burner consumed alcohol
prior to cross burning); United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993) (alcohol
consumed prior); People v. Carr, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (cross burner
was intoxicated); see also Neil Lewis, A Judge, A Renomination, and the Cross-burning
Case that Won't End, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at A16 (describing drunken cross burner).
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ings. After Stephen beats Michael at chess, Michael cunningly decides to
"get back" at Stephen by burning a cross in his front yard. Michael hits
on this idea because he has seen the movie Mississippi Burning and has a
vague idea that African Americans don't like burning crosses. Michael
later insists he did not want to scare Stephen, but rather just wanted to em-
barrass him.
Michael constructs a five-foot-high and three-foot-wide cross out of
some scrap wood. Just before dark one evening when Stephen and his
family are visiting for his grandmother's birthday, Michael places the
cross, which has been soaked with gasoline, on Stephen's grandmother's
front lawn. Michael lights a few firecrackers to get the family's attention
and runs to the shrubbery to watch as everyone reacts. Almost all assem-
bled guests, besides Stephen's family, are residents of the neighborhood
and are horrified when they see the burning cross. Stephen's grandmother
bursts into tears at the site of the flaming cross. The story of the burning
cross spreads around the neighborhood, causing great concern and worry.
In this particular case, Michael did not intend to frighten anyone.
Nevertheless, because of the legacy of the burning cross, his actions caused
as much pain, terror, and emotional trauma as a cross burner who had
intended to cause these disturbances. As in Black, Michael's intention
cannot be inferred from the mere existence of the burning cross or from the
fear of those who observed it. There was evidence that the cross burning in
Black caused fear, even in the unlikely event it was not so intended. In
Black, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the car containing an
African American family had viewed the cross and driven off at a high rate
of speed. 193 Similarly, one white witness testified that the cross burning
frightened her. This was not taken by the Court as evidence of Black's
intention to intimidate. In Michael's case, under the rule established by the
Court in Black, the state would be prohibited from using a cross burning
statute to punish Michael or any others involved in this type of cross burn-
ing.
The inability to use a cross-burning statute to punish this type of ac-
tion, though not always fatal, may significantly handicap a state's efforts
to bring the perpetrator to justice. While Justice Scalia claimed that the
defendant in R.A. V could have been prosecuted under a variety of con-
tent-neutral statutes, the prosecutor in the case claimed that this was not
true. The prosecutor searched for a statute under which to prosecute Viktora
but was unable to charge him with trespass, arson, or vandalism because
required elements for each of these crimes were missing. 194 Cross burning
'93 Petitioner's Brief at 6, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
194 The Minnesota trespass law required a warning, and no warning was given. Ac-
cording to the prosecutor, some of the elements of arson were missing. Finally, the charge
would have failed under the vandalism statute because there was no destruction of prop-
erty. Lederer, Prosecutor's Dilemma, supra note 91, at 195.
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is notoriously difficult to prosecute under content-neutral laws because
the act of burning a cross often does not cause damage to property.
Although in Black the Court provided a method for states to punish
cross burning without violating the First Amendment, it did this by dis-
tinguishing cross burnings in which the perpetrator manifests the inten-
tion to intimidate his or her victim from "innocent" cross burnings. The
Court's focus on the perpetrator's intent to intimidate sidestepped the
question that ought to have been the Court's focus: whether a cross burning
has the actual effect of intimidating victims. Moreover, the Court's rule
created a significant loophole through which perpetrators causing serious
damage to victims and communities may escape prosecution under cross
burning statutes. Part IV suggests an alternative approach to weighing the
gravity of the threat posed by cross burning against perpetrators' First
Amendment rights.
IV. A CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH TO CROSS BURNING
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin
of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to circumstances and the time in which it is used.' 95
In Black the majority opinion offered only a brief explanation as to
why the act of burning a cross is ever entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection. Justice O'Connor wrote that cross burning is expressive conduct
because it is dramatic and represents a message that the speaker wishes
to communicate. 96 She cited R.A.V for the proposition that cross burning
is expressive conduct similar to burning a flag or wearing a black arm-
band to protest the Vietnam War. 197 Once cross burning was lumped into
the same category as other symbolic expressions protected by the First
Amendment, the Court fell into a doctrinal bind. Unless there is a com-
pelling reason to deny First Amendment protection, cross burning should
be treated the same as similar expression in the category.
In Black, as in R.A.V., the Court assumed with little discussion that
cross burning merits some First Amendment protection because it com-
municates a message, giving cross burning the same legal status as, for ex-
ample, anti-war protest.'98 To equate an act of violence like cross burning
with protest activity fails to acknowledge the context of cross burning and
the hardship, suffering, and trauma the act of cross burning visits on vic-
tims.
195 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
'9 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003).
197 Id. at 1548. For commentary on the lack of similarity between burning a cross and
burning a flag, see Judith Butler, Constitutions and "Survivor Stories": Burning Acts:
Injurious Speech, 3 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 199 (1996).
198 Butler, supra note 197.
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Despite the Court's long description of the terror visited upon vic-
tims of cross burning, the ultimate path taken by Justice O'Connor was
centered almost entirely on the perpetrator-what he or she intended when
burning the cross. No mention was made of the victims' perception of the
action. The primary concern Justice O'Connor expressed was with the
perpetrator's state of mind. Because the state's power to regulate cross
burning is restricted to crosses burned with the intent to intimidate, if the
perpetrator meant no harm when burning the cross, then under a statute
that conforms to Black, he or she would escape punishment.
A. Toward a Victim-Centered Approach in Cross Burning Cases
People of color victimized by cross burning are unlikely to see any
cross burning as innocent. Victims may be frightened and feel threatened
even when the cross burning was intended as a prank. Several scholars
have advocated victim-centered approaches in two areas closely related
to cross burning-hate speech 1 and hate crime.2" Victim-centered ap-
proaches like the one proposed by Mari Matsuda often locate solutions to
legal problems in victims' social reality and experience.20' For instance,
in approaching the regulation of racist hate speech, Matsuda examines
the experience and the effects of such speech on its victims. This meth-
odology leads Matsuda to call for criminal and administrative sanctions
for particular types of racist hate speech. Approaches like Matsuda's of-
ten fall into one of the "outsider" jurisprudence categories-feminist ju-
risprudence or critical race theory. Victim-centered approaches often me-
diate between absolutist approaches to the First Amendment and a per-
spective informed by the stories of people of color.
21 2
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that advocates of victim-
centered approaches to the First Amendment do not oppose free speech.
Though outsider scholars who are critical of traditional approaches to
First Amendment doctrine are often criticized as insufficiently concerned
with free speech protections, the vast majority of those who offer victim-
centered First Amendment approaches to hate crime and hate speech main-
tain a commitment to civil liberties and often express concern for the
199 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Lawrence, Cross-
burning and the Sound of Silence, supra note 172; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Steven
Shiffnin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 43 (1994).
20 See generally BELL, supra note 5; FREDRICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE BIAS
CRIME UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999); Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 799 (1999); Jones, supra note 57.
201 Matsuda, supra note 199, at 2324.
202 Alice K. Ma, Comment, Campus Hate Speech Codes: Affirmative Action in the Al-
location of Speech Rights, 83 CAL. L. REV. 693, 702 (1995).
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protection of the civil liberties of those whose views they find repug-
nant.20 3 Scholars offering victim-centered solutions maintain that the protec-
tion of victims' rights is entirely consistent with the protection of civil
liberties.21
Ultimately, the primary difference between victim-centered and more
traditional First Amendment perspectives is the way in which each view
approaches power imbalances in social relations. More traditional First
Amendment approaches, such as the one taken by the Court in Black and
R.A. V., are primarily concerned with the state's power to silence individuals.
Wary of the misuse of state power, they want to be sure that citizens have
adequate avenues for expression. Outsider legal scholars worry about the
state, too, but are at least as concerned about power differentials between
groups of citizens. Their concern with power imbalances dictates their
agenda: harnessing the state's power to prevent the more powerful from
.silencing the less powerful. 2 5 Victim-centered approaches therefore probe
the scope of the possibilities for state intervention on behalf of victims.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Black seemed to imply that there
were two types of cross burnings-cross burnings that were committed with
the intent to intimidate, and those done without such an intent, or "inno-
cent" cross burnings. Under the rule created by the Court in Black, only
the former are regulable, while the latter are protected by the First Amend-
ment.
The victim-centered view of the First Amendment protection afforded
to cross burning that this Article articulates differs from the approach taken
by the Court in Black by suggesting that cross burning deserves finer
classification, and that more sweeping regulation than the Court currently
permits is consistent with First Amendment principles. Close attention to
the history of cross burning suggests that it may be better to divide cross
burnings, into three categories: (1) cross burnings targeted at an individ-
ual that are intended to threaten; (2) cross burnings aimed at an individ-
ual that are not intended to cause fear; and (3) cross burnings that are not
directly targeted at an identified victim. Cross burnings in the first category,
for example, would include the cross burned in R.A. V. and would be
regulable under the rule established in Black. The second category would
include crosses burned as jokes or pranks. Crosses burned at Klan rallies or
marches would fall into the last category. Neither the second nor the third
categories are regulable under the rule established by the Court in Black.
203 See, e.g., Lawrence, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence, supra note 172, at
789-98; Matsuda, supra note 199, at 2321-22; Shiffrin, supra note 199, at 92-97.
204 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991) (arguing that campus anti-hate speech regulation
need not offend the First Amendment); Delgado, supra note 199 (suggesting a tort action
for racial words is consistent with the First Amendment).
205 See Matsuda, supra note 199, at 2324-26.
[Vol. 39
Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses
From a victim-centered perspective both the first and the second cate-
gory of cross burnings should be regulable. A victim-centered approach
to the First Amendment protection for cross burning is concerned with
the terror that cross burning inflicts when it is directly targeted at identified
victims. Victims are, of course, directly targeted if the cross is burned on
their property. They may also be targeted if the cross is burned at another
location close to their home and if there is also evidence to suggest that
the cross burning is directed at them. For example, in Singer v. United
States,"6 Timothy Singer had an argument with his neighbors. After the
argument, Singer told them that he had in his possession a half-stick of
dynamite and was going to "blow up all those motherfucking niggers."207
Singer and his co-defendant then constructed a cross nine feet tall and
placed it near a fence that separated the houses of two of his Black
neighbors. The following morning the words "Die Nigger KKK" and
"KKK rules" were painted on the homes of Black families living near
Singer."8 Though the cross was not placed on either family's property, it
was clearly directed at the Black families living in the cross burner's im-
mediate vicinity.2"
The victim-centered perspective offered here is heavily based on the
empirical use of cross burning as an instrument of terror and therefore
takes much of its justification from the context in which the burning cross
has been and continues to be used. It is for that reason that this perspec-
tive does not argue that the third and perhaps the most infrequent type of
cross burning, those not aimed at an identified victim or victims, such as
a cross burned at a Ku Klux Klan rally or a cross burned at a march should
be regulable. 1 ° Not only are cases in which crosses are burned at rallies
or marches with no intent to intimidate anyone rarer, but when they do
occur they may be less harmful. Individuals are more vulnerable, and the
in terrorum effect is greater-when they are targeted-individually sin-
gled out for threats.
A victim-centered approach to the First Amendment protection of
cross burning would require the courts to look more closely at the impact
206 No. 94-3039, 1994 WL 589562 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994).
207 Id. at * 1.
208 Id.
209 Id. See also United States v. Lee, 6 F3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993). In Lee, the defendant
burned a cross on a hill 386 feet from an apartment complex in which several African
Americans resided. Id. at 1298. Though the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant's con-
viction for other reasons, it indicated that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to conclude
the defendant's actions were directed to the Black residents of the apartment building. Id.
at 1303.
210 There is an exception to the general rule this Article proposes that the state would
not be able to regulate burning crosses at marches or rallies when circumstances suggest
that the cross burning is directed at identified victims. The presence of a single group of
minorities in an all-white town, for instance, may indicate that they are identified targets.
Similarly, if Klan members travel to a neighboring all-Black town to hold a rally with a
cross burning, this may signal that there are identified targets.
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of each cross burning on the victim. Below I offer three doctrinal avenues
that courts might use that are consistent with a victim-centered approach.
1. Cross Burning as a Threat
The first of these approaches involves treating cross burning as a
"true threat" and subjecting it to the full true threats analysis. Analyzing
cross burning as a true threat is an approach that has been taken by lower
courts, but was not the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Black."'
There is a clear justification to take this approach because part of the burning
cross's meaning to victims comes from its frequent use as a threat of vio-
lence.212 Victims understand cross burning to be a precursor to other vio-
lent behavior and understand the threat that the perpetrator wishes to
communicate. A victim-centered approach to the regulation of cross burning
could be grounded in the recognition that cross burning is threatening.
The Supreme Court recognized in R.A. V. that a state may prohibit
non-verbal expressive activity, so long as the prohibition is aimed at the
underlying conduct, and not its expressive content.2"3 In Black, there was
significant evidence to suggest the legislature had banned cross burning
because of the action it entails, rather than because of its segregationist
message. First, Virginia's original cross burning statute was passed in the
wake of numerous cross burnings on the lawns of Black business owners
and those who lived in predominately white areas.21 4 Moreover, in 1952
in Virginia the law mandated racial segregation in schools, public ac-
commodations, association, and even marriage.215 It seems unlikely that
the legislature was attempting to express disfavor toward the message of
cross burning. 2 6 As Justice Thomas wrote in his dissent in Black:
211 As the discussion supra Part III.C details, though Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705 (1969), was cited by the Court in Black, the Court adopts an intent-based standard,
rather than approaching cross burning as a "true threat."
212 See discussion supra Part 1.
213 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
214 Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1565 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18-327 (Michie 1950) (repealed 1960) (requiring sepa-
ration of "white" and "colored" in places of entertainment or public assemblage); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-54 (Michie 1950) (repealed 1968) (prohibiting racial intermarriage); VA.
CODE ANN. § 22-221 (Michie 1950) (repealed 1972) (requiring segregated schooling). The
petitioner's brief and Justice Thomas's dissent list several other segregationist practices in
force in Virginia at the time. See Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct.
1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1565-66 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216 The defendant in Black argued that the cross-burning statute demonstrated the Vir-
ginia legislature's attempt to express disfavor regarding the message of cross burning.
While it is certainly possible for a segregationist society to implement a content-based law,
in this case it is less likely that the law was aimed at the message behind cross burning.
The existence of a legal regime mandating separation of the races suggests that the legis-
lature had no problem with the message of Black inferiority inherent in cross burning, but
rather with the violence of cross burning.
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It strains credulity to suggest that a state legislature that adopted
a litany of segregationist law self-contradictorily intended to
squelch the segregationist message. Even for segregationists,
violent and terroristic conduct, the Siamese twin of cross burn-
ing, was intolerable.2
17
Expression may not be protected if it falls into the category of true
threats as defined by Watts. Federal courts in several circuits have relied
on the Watts true threats analysis to reject First Amendment challenges to
convictions for cross burning under 18 U.S.C. § 241,218 the federal statute
that punishes interference with federal housing rights." 9 In each of these
cases, whites burned crosses on the lawns of Blacks or minorities in an
attempt to drive them from the neighborhood. Analyzing cross burning as
a "true threat" not only recognizes the threatening nature of the activity,
but also allows courts to consider openly the impact of the crime on cross
burning victims as part of their analysis. In examining whether the cross
burning was a true threat, the courts frequently looked to the factual rec-
ord to discern the reaction of victims to the cross burning.
The examination of a victim's reaction in a true threats case may be
just one part of a sustained review of the context of the crime. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Magleby22 ° the defendant was convicted of civil
rights violations for having burned a cross on the lawn of an interracial
family. On appeal, Magleby argued in part that the district court erred in
instructing the jury that they could consider "the reaction of the victims
and other witnesses to the cross burning in determining the defendant's
intent" to deprive the victims of their civil rights.221
The district court's instructions to the jury were heavily context-based.
In addition to the victim's reaction to the cross burning, the court also
allowed the jury to consider as evidence of Magelby's intent "the entire
context in which the cross was burned," including "the defendant's ac-
tions before, during and after the cross burning," and "the location at which
the cross was burned and its nearness to the intended victims." '222 In Ma-
gelby's case the context of the crime included evidence that he had spent
217 Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1566 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218 Section 241 prohibits any person or persons from conspiring "to injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any person ... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 241
(2000).
219 United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hartbar-
ger, 148 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1998); Singer v. United States, No. 94-3039, 1994 WL 589562
(6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994); United States v. J.H.H., 22 E3d 821 (8th Cir. 1994).
220241 F.3d 1306.
221 Id. at 1311.
222 Id.
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the day of the crime telling racist jokes, listening to racist CDs, and ac-
cessing internet hate sites.1
23
In evaluating Magelby's arguments, the Court of Appeals held that
evidence of the recipient's response is relevant to whether a true threat
exists. In weighing the recipient's response, it used a "reasonable recipi-
ent" test-whether a reasonable person would find that the threat existed.
In Magelby, the Tenth Circuit, as had the Seventh and Eighth circuits,
found that the victims' reaction to the cross burning was relevant to the
defendant's intention to deprive individuals of their civil rights.
2 2 4
The Watts true threats analysis was also used by the California Court
of Appeals to respond to a First Amendment challenge to a California
statute prohibiting cross burning on the property of another without authori-
zation and with intent to terrorize. 25 In Steven S.26 the defendant was
charged with violating the cross burning statute for burning a cross on the
front lawn of a multi-racial family as a Friday-the-Thirteenth joke. He
argued that the absence of any intent to intimidate meant his actions did
not constitute a true threat under Watts.
Applying Watts, the court adopted a victim-centered analysis. In the
court's view, in the case of malicious cross burnings, so long as the per-
son intentionally or knowingly burned the cross and it could be reasona-
bly foreseen that the victim "would construe a malicious cross burning as
a serious expression of intent to do harm," then the true threat test of
2 3 Id. at 1308.
224 Id. at 1311.
225 CAL. PENAL CODE § 11411 (West 2000). The relevant portion of the statute pro-
vides:
(c) Any person who burns or desecrates a cross or other religious symbol, know-
ing it to be a religious symbol, on the private property of another without authori-
zation for the purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant of that private prop-
erty or in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing the owner or occupant of
that private property, or who bums, desecrates, or destroys a cross or other relig-
ious symbol; knowing it to be a religious symbol, on the property of a primary
school, junior high school, or high school for the purpose of terrorizing any per-
son who attends or works at the school or who is otherwise associated with the
school, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or 2
or 3 years, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both
the fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one
year, by a fine not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine
and imprisonment for the first conviction and by imprisonment in the state prison
for 16 months or 2 or 3 years, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in a county
jail not to exceed one year, by a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars
($15,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment for any subsequent conviction.
(d) As used in this section, "terrorize" means to cause a person of ordinary emo-
tions and sensibilities to fear for personal safety.
221 In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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Watts was satisfied. 227 The court indicated that a victim would "surely"
view cross burning as a "serious expression of intent to do harm. 228
In a way that further recognized the historical legacy and context of
cross burning, the court looked to the issue of whether cross burning could
constitute "fighting words." According to the court, fighting words and
cross burning are similar because "[a] malicious cross burning in the yard
of one's home is surely a terrifying experience, subjecting the victim to
fear and intimidation. By its very commission it inflicts immediate in-
jury. ' 229 According to the court, a cross burning was not a joke or type of
prank that simply caused hurt feelings.
[T]he act we call malicious cross burning is directed at indi-
viduals-here, the Fosters-and it goes far beyond hurt feelings,
offense, or resentment. It causes terror in specific victims. That
aspect brings the context within the scope of the fighting words
doctrine.230
The California court was careful to distinguish the California statute from
the St. Paul ordinance at issue in R.A. V 231 Although the court found that
the California statute was a content-based regulation of speech, it ruled
that it fell within all three exceptions set forth in R.A.V Unlike the St.
Paul statute, the California statute only prohibited malicious cross burn-
ing-unauthorized cross burning on another person's property-while
the St. Paul statute at issue in R.A.V proscribed all cross burning.23 2 This
was important to the court because it was a sign that the legislature had
focused its attention on a particular type of cross burning, proscribable
for the same reason that fighting words and true threats generally are pro-
scribable. 233
The California court also indicated that there was no realistic possi-
bility that the cross-burning statute had been passed as an attempt to sup-
press the views of cross burners. The court cited the legislature's decla-
ration of intent as evidence that the statute was not designed to suppress
expression. The California legislature indicated that "[i]t is not the intent
of this chapter to interfere with the exercise of rights protected by the
Constitution of the United States. The Legislature recognizes the consti-
tutional right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any subject
whatsoever and to associate with others who share similar beliefs. '234
227 Id. at 648.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 649.
231 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
232 Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
233 Id.
23 Id. at 651.
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The difference between the true threats approach to cross burning,
and the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Black, lies in the expres-
sive value each approach recognizes in cross burning. The California court
maintained that burning a cross on someone else's lawn did not have a
high degree of expressive value. The California court clearly appreciated
the racialized context within which many cross burnings occur. Even
without the legislature's declaration of intent, the court wrote, "it is evi-
dent that the expressive element of an unauthorized cross burning on an-
other person's property is incidental at best. At its core, this is an act of
terrorism that inflicts pain on its victim, not the expression of an idea." '235
Although it may allow a court to focus more on the victim, a true
threats analysis is not a magic bullet. An approach that requires courts to
determine whether a particular cross burning is a threat leaves much to
the judgment of individual judges. While the various devices to which
courts have resorted to ascertain the existence of the threat-for example,
attention to the reasonable listener, or attempting to divine factual cir-
cumstances of the speech-are more likely to capture victims' perspectives,
this scheme may obscure a court's role in evaluating, and eventually le-
gitimizing through the use of "reasonableness," particular speakers and
hearers. In other words, courts pick and choose what circumstances are
relevant. The mere specification of a "reasonable speaker" or "reasonable
listener" test does not in itself imply a method for understanding how
listeners interpret messages, and the flexibility that these tests therefore
leave to courts will leave cross burning doctrine unpredictable and insuffi-
ciently protective of victims. As the cases involving challenges to con-
victions for threatening to kill the President demonstrate, one person's
threat is another's joke or political statement. The true threats analysis does
not answer how as a society we should choose among competing views
of threats to better interpret meaning in different contexts.
2. Regulating the Secondary Effects of Cross Burning
A second way that the Court in Black might have approached the de-
fendants' challenge from a victim-centered perspective would have been
to evaluate whether Virginia's cross-burning statute was justified by the
secondary effects of cross burning. States may regulate a particular sub-
class of speech when that subclass "happens to be associated with par-
ticular 'secondary effects' . . . so that the regulation is 'justified without
reference to the content of the speech.'" 236
235 Id.236 R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986)).
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In Renton v. Playtime Theatres,237 the Supreme Court upheld an or-
dinance that restricted the location of adult movie theatres to greater than
1000 feet of any church, residential zone, park or within one mile of any
school. 238 The city justified the ordinance based on the secondary effects-
crime, decreased property values, and decline in the value of the city's
neighborhoods, and other quality of life issues that it argued sexually ori-
ented businesses cause.239 Finding the articulated governpnental interest
substantial, and that the city had allowed alternate avenues for communi-
cation, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the ordi-
nance.
2 40
The Supreme Court has rejected as a secondary effect the emotive
impact of the speech, such as insult or offense victims may feel in response
to the speech. 241 In the Supreme Court's view, the emotive impact of the
speech is a primary rather than secondary effect of the speech. By con-
trast, a victim-centered perspective might identify the emotional harm of
cross burning as more salient. For instance, the California Supreme Court
held in Steven S., "the fear and intimidation of the victim of a malicious
cross burning crosses the line between emotive reaction and tangible in-
jury.' 242 It defined those secondary effects to include "the infliction, upon a
specific victim, of immediate fear and intimidation and a threat of future
harm.
2 43
The purpose of the secondary effects exception is to allow states to
regulate the negative byproducts of speech or behavior that are removed
from the activity itself. In Black, the Commonwealth of Virginia articu-
lated several negative byproducts of cross burning similar to those ac-
cepted in Renton-negative effects on commerce, property values, and
race relations 4. 21 Cross burning has been frequently used to run minorities
out of the neighborhood and thus prevent the integration of white neigh-
borhoods. A court could easily find that states have a significant interest
in preventing such obstacles to integration.
The reasoning in Wisconsin v. Mitchell 45 provides additional support
for states' ability to regulate the secondary effects of bias-motivated con-
duct like cross burning. In Mitchell, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited amicus
briefs that indicated that bias-motivated crimes cause particular harms-
they are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, they may inflict ex-
237 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
238 Id. at 44.
239 Id. at 48.
240 Id. at 49-55.
241 R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 394.
2421n re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See also State v.
Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 226 (Wash. 1993).
243 Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
244 Petitioner's Brief at 39, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
245 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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treme emotional harm, and they may incite community unrest.246 The
Court viewed these consequences as "an adequate explanation" for the
state legislature's creation of a penalty enhancement statute. 47 The addi-
tional harm caused by bias-motivated conduct could justify greater pen-
alties: "[I]t is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those
should be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the
public safety and happiness.
241
Though the secondary effects approach may at first seem particularly
attractive, especially given the ancillary effects of cross burning, this ap-
proach has doctrinal flaws. Fear and intimidation caused by cross burning
are communicative effects that flow directly from the message of hatred
the perpetrator is sending by burning the cross. The harms of cross burning,
especially the resulting fear and terror, are related to the threatening mes-
sages that cross burners send. These are not secondary effects in the same
way that prostitution is a secondary effect of the establishment of busi-
nesses that offer nude dancing. 249 While the government may regulate
secondary effects, the First Amendment prohibits the government from
using content-based regulation to prevent the primary effects of expression.
3. Cross Burning as a Hate Crime
Following the Supreme Court's construction of cross burning in R.A. V.,
many courts have approached cross burning primarily as speech. As this
Article argues, the act of burning a cross is indisputably conduct, albeit
conduct with an expressive element. 2 0 Analyzing cross burning as dis-
criminatory bias-motivated conduct-hate crime-recognizes its histori-
cal and situational context, and also the victim's perspective. Hate crimes
are crimes motivated by bias based on race, religion or sexual orientation.
Most, if not all, cross burners have white supremacist goals, suggesting
that their actions are bias-motivated.
246 Id. at 487-88.
247 Id. at 488.
248 Id.
249 There is not a perfect relationship between nude dancing and the harms that the
Court considered relevant in the case of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
Although there is not a direct causal link between nude dancing and prostitution, Justice
Souter's concurrence noted that prostitution correlates with nude dancing. Barnes, 501
U.S. at 584 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Despite the correlation, Justice Souter
concurred in the Court's opinion upholding the regulation against First Amendment chal-
lenge because the harm of prostitution does not flow from nude dancing as expression. Id.
at 586.
250 The argument I make here that cross burning is bias-motivated conduct is distinct
from the one made by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Black. Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct.
1536, 1562 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas, who would have voted to uphold the
Virginia statute, argues that cross burning is conduct devoid of any substantial expressive
component. Id. at 1556.
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The Supreme Court defined the degree to which the First Amendment
protects bias-motivated conduct in Wisconsin v. Mitchell by ruling on a
First Amendment challenge to a Wisconsin hate crime penalty-enhancement
statute.2 11 Mitchell was a Black defendant who had been convicted for
aggravated battery after he incited a group of men and boys to attack a
white teenager.252 Immediately prior to the attack, Mitchell and the group
of Black men and boys had been discussing the movie Mississippi Burn-
ing.2 53 After the discussion, Mitchell spotted the victim and told the
group, "There goes a white boy; go get him. '254 Because the jury agreed
that the victim had been intentionally selected on account of his race, the
maximum sentence for Mitchell's crime was increased under Wisconsin's
hate crime penalty enhancement statute. 5 That statute increases the
maximum penalty if the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person
against whom the crime ... is committed ... because of the race, relig-
ion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of
that person." '256
Mitchell argued that the application of the penalty-enhancement
provision used in sentencing violated his First Amendment rights.5 7 Re-
lying on R.A.V, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed.2 58 It held that by
criminalizing the defendant's selection of particular victims, the Wisconsin
statute was punishing thought protected by the First Amendment.5 9 The
court found that punishing particular types of thought "violates the First
Amendment directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be
offensive thought."216
The Supreme Court reversed.2 61 Chief Justice Rehnquist gave several
reasons for upholding the Wisconsin statute. First, the Wisconsin statute
was similar to constitutionally valid criminal statutes that punish the de-
fendant differently depending on what motivated the crime. 262 Second,
racial animus plays a similar role in the Wisconsin statute as it does un-
der federal and state antidiscrimination laws also previously upheld as
constitutional. 26 Finally, R.A. V is inapposite because it addressed a stat-
ute prohibiting "fighting words," whereas the Wisconsin statute ad-
dressed bias-motivated conduct, not speech.
264
25 508 U.S. at 479.
252 Id. at 479-80.
253 Id. at 480.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 WIs. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1996).
257 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481; State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 1992).
258 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 815.
259 Id. at 811.
260 Id.
261 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 490.
262 Id. at 485-86.
263 Id. at 487.
264 Id.
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There are clear similarities between the punishment of cross burning
under statutes aimed specifically at that activity and the punishment of
other bias-motivated conduct as allowed by Mitchell. Both crimes consist
of conduct that may be punished under content-neutral "general" crimi-
nal statutes. In addition, both are "message" crimes and therefore contain
an expressive component. 65 Both bias-motivated assaults and cross burnings
are hate crimes, as well as "general" crimes, because of the perpetrator's
motive.
Analogies can be drawn between cross burning and the bias-motivated
physical harm for which the Court permitted additional penalty in Mitchell.
The Court suggested in Mitchell that an additional justification for penalty
enhancement statutes was that bias-motivated attacks cause greater individ-
ual and societal harms.2 66 Similarly, cross burning aimed at racial and
ethnic minorities in the neighborhoods in which cross burning often oc-
curs also causes real harm-practical interference with housing rights.
Cross burnings and other types of move-in violence happen so frequently
that such incidents serve as incentives for victims to leave as well as disin-
centives for other minorities to move to white neighborhoods. The harm
of lost housing and the practical restriction of minorities' rights to live in
a neighborhood of their choosing is the functional equivalent of the tan-
gible harm of physical assault for which the Court authorized additional
penalties in Mitchell.
A few courts have relied on Mitchell in cross-burning cases to sup-
port the notion that cross burning may be regulated. One such case was
United States v. Hayward.267 Hayward did not involve a state cross burn-
ing statute, but rather a challenge to § 3631 (b) of the Fair Housing Act on
First Amendment grounds . 2 1 This section of the Fair Housing Act is a
federal misdemeanor statute that punishes violent interference with the
housing rights of any person because of race, religion, sex, handicap, or
familial status.2 69 One of the arguments that the defendants made on ap-
265 For example, jurisdictions that penalize bias-motivated assaults under a separate
hate crimes statute allow prosecution both as an "ordinary" criminal assault and as a hate
crime. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §§ 37, 39 (West 2000).
.266 See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 488.267 6 F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993).
268 42 U.S.C. § 363 1(b) (2000).
269 The relevant section of the statute provides:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with-
(a) any person because of his race, color, religion, sex, handicap .... familial
status . . . , or national origin and because he is or has been selling, purchasing,
renting, financing, occupying, or contracting or negotiating for the sale, purchase,
rental, financing or occupation of any dwelling, or applying for or participating in
any service, organization, or facility relating to the business of selling or renting
any dwellings; or
(b) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
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peal of a conviction under the statute was that cross burning was pro-
tected speech.
270
The defendants in Hayward were convicted for having burned two
crosses on the property of Bob and Mary Jones, a white couple with Black
friends who occasionally visited. 27 ' The first cross, which was approxi-
mately six feet tall and four feet wide, was set on fire in a concrete block
that the defendants had placed in the Joneses' driveway. At midnight the
same evening, a larger cross, approximately seven feet tall and five feet
across, was burned in the driveway.
272
In Hayward, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that
there is a message in cross burning-that Blacks are unwelcome and as-
sociation with them is not approved-but found that because cross burning
promotes fear, intimidation, and psychological injury, it is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.273 In rejecting the defendants' claims that
§ 3631(b) was unconstitutional, the Seventh Circuit also relied on Mitchell,
finding the statute to be aimed at curtailing discriminatory conduct, not
speech. 274 The court also found that § 3631(b) was a proper exercise of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment. 275 Moreover, the
statute advanced an important and substantial government interest-pro-
tecting individuals' right to occupy housing free from threats or intimi-
dation based on race.276 Because the statute was a content-neutral effort at
regulating "the wrongful conduct of threats and intimidation," it did not
violate the First Amendment. 277
Treating cross burning as a hate crime is the strongest of three vic-
tim-centered approaches. In addition to having stronger doctrinal foun-
dations than the others, it goes much further than Virginia v. Black in al-
lowing punishment for cross burning. Analyzing cross burning as a hate
crime allows a court to punish all cross burnings that cause significant
harm, rather than just punishing those that are intended to do so. Thus,
individuals who burn crosses on people's lawns as jokes, without in-
tending to intimidate, could be punished. By requiring an intent to in-
timidate, Black does not seem to allow the punishment of the "innocent"
any other person or any class of persons from-
(1) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap . . . , familial status . . . , or national origin, in any of the activities,
services, organizations or facilities described in subsection ... (a) of this section;
.... shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both ....
42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)-(b).
270 Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1249.
271 Id. at 1243.
272 Id. at 1244.
273 Id. at 1250.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 1251.
277 Id.
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cross burner who causes harm. Placing cross burning with other types of
racially motivated crime also forces courts to recognize cross burning's
historical legacy and the context in which it is used as tool of segrega-
tionist violence. This particular approach has the added benefit of allow-
ing courts to acknowledge, as the Supreme Court did in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,2 78 the effect of perpetrators' actions on the community as whole.
With regard to racially motivated crime, frequently the law has not
attempted to redress injuries against people of color. Critical scholars have
recognized that, "[t]he places where the law does not go to redress harm
have tended to be the places where women, children, people of color, and
poor people live."279 Often, in cases of hate speech and bias-motivated
crime, the justification offered for the failure to address targeted acts of
racial violence is that the First Amendment does not allow such redress.
Adopting a victim-centered perspective and treating cross burning as
bias-motivated crime recognizes the injury caused by cross burning. If
cross burning is evaluated as a threat, courts may consider the victim's
perception of the incident. If it is viewed as bias-motivated conduct, a
court will be forced to evaluate a host of factors to determine whether the
cross burning was actually motivated by bias. In both of these cases, rig-
orous attention to whether the defendant actually targeted victims and
whether the behavior was pure speech or bias-motivated conduct will
safeguard the First Amendment rights of those who hold racist views.
CONCLUSION: CROSS BURNING, RACE, SPACE, AND POWER
In white neighborhoods all across America, in cities, in the suburbs,
in small towns, in the North (New York and Boston), in the South (Nash-
ville and Louisville), in the West (San Diego), and in the Midwest (Chi-
cago), crosses are burning.28° Some of these incidents involve crosses set
on fire.28' Others are less literal, consisting of acts of violence like broken
windows and other forms of vandalism done to minority newcomers' cars
and property.2 82 The explicit threat that cross burning conveys is clear:
278 508 U.S. 476.
279 Matsuda, supra note 199, at 2322. See also KimberI6 Crenshaw, A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (1990) (criti-
cizing the failure of anti-discrimination law to recognize the multi-dimensionality of Black
women's lives); Catherine A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) (describing the failure of judges adjudicating First Amend-
ment cases to recognize a variety of harms to women); Matsuda & Lawrence, supra note
188 (criticizing the failure of the Court to appreciate the victim's story in R.A.V).
280See Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 401-13 (describing housing-related
crimes in public and private housing in cities including Boston, New York, Chicago, Nash-
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We may kill you, or hurt you badly. Believe it. We have already
come to your home and we have done this hateful and danger-
ous thing in front of you. So, we don't just talk. We act. Next
time we may torch your home. Or bomb your car. Or shoot into
your windows. No one stopped us when we burned the cross.
No one will stop us next time either. Fear us.
283
By naming cross burning as a threat, this Article does not mean to sug-
gest that the perpetrator does not intend to send a message. Burning a cross
is "designed to communicate the message of white supremacy to the black
community.' '2 4 But that supremacist message always carries the threat of
violence. That threat makes people fear for their safety and has very real
effects on the lives of minorities.
Many African Americans and other minorities who are looking to
move to a neighborhood may be dissuaded by racial attacks.285 Such at-
tacks restrict housing choices and enhance racial isolation in housing and
community life. One of the distinctions between cross burners and others
engaged in symbolic expression is that cross burners are often not con-
tent simply to express their views. Frequently accompanied or followed
by physical violence, cross burning is not "mere advocacy, but rather an
overt act of intimidation which, because of its historical context, is often
considered a precursor to ... violence. '286 Moreover, cross burning on
minorities' property is personalized. It is directed at a specific victim. A
burning cross is a threat newcomers do well to take seriously.
Those who oppose statutes regulating cross burning have framed the
issue as being about the right to hold racist views 287 or to pursue racist
politics. 288 From this perspective, the injury of cross burning is a minor
one, consisting largely of a victim's "offense" at the racist's views.289 To
those who hold this perspective, cross burning laws constitute censorship,
expressing the government's hostility to a cross burner's point of view.
290
283 Petitioner's Brief at 35, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107).
24 Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Ordinary Complicity, BALT. SUN, June 17, 2001, at C4. See also
Wang, supra note 200, at 843-51 (describing use of lynching to further white landowners'
economic interests).
281 Rubinowitz & Perry, supra note 5, at 385.
286 United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 1991).
287 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 15, at 569-83.
288 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
289 See Respondents' Brief on Merits at 13, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003)
(No. 01-1107) (describing "undifferentiated fear" that those viewing cross burning may
feel); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute at 6, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct.
1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107) ("No Supreme Court case holds that expressive conduct may be
proscribed based upon its offensive impact.") (emphasis added).
290 See, e.g., EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT AND THE LANDMARK R.A.V CASE 208-09 (1994); Respondents' Brief on Merits at
10, Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107); Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at 12, Virginia v. Black,
123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107) (concluding that statute unmistakably targets view-
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The First Amendment, this line of argument goes, preserves the right of
cross burners to burn crosses in order to avoid suppressing the message
expressed by those burning crosses.
Words are not crystals, as Justice Holmes has written, "transparent
and unchanged."29' Rather, words assume meaning from their context and
the ways in which they are used. The converse view, that words have trans-
parent, fixed meaning irrespective of either use or context, rejects cross
burning laws for First Amendment reasons. In doing so, it divorces cross
burners' views from their actions. Those who adopt this perspective ig-
nore the context of the vast majority of cross burning that occurs in this
country.
Attention to context when evaluating cross burning reveals that the
circumstances in which cross burning occurs usually involve resistance
on the part of whites to minority integration. It is not done to express a
particular political view, but rather represents a struggle to preserve white
neighborhoods at the expense of minorities' housing options and a fully
integrated community.2 92 Cases detailing the use of cross burning and em-
pirical research describing violence that has occurred in the wake of mi-
norities moving into formerly all-white areas demonstrates that cross burn-
ers are fighting against the presence of minorities, with the minority
homes the battle ground and a burning cross a principal weapon.
In this war against minority "intrusion," once fought by the Klan,
now largely waged by those unaffiliated with formally organized extremist
groups, cross burning is a particularly effective weapon. It is so effective
a threat because of its power to communicate the precise nature of the
threat in such a chilling way. Victims understand, and are frightened.
The tragedy of racial violence directed at minorities integrating white
neighborhoods is magnified by the inadequacy of existing social and le-
gal responses. Other members of their new neighborhood may openly
support the desire of the perpetrators to drive the intruders out.293 Because
racially motivated crime is often underenforced by police officers who side
with the perpetrators, few of these crimes may be investigated and even-
tually prosecuted.2 94 Unwilling to risk their families' safety, some minorities
point that symbolic act conveys); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Rutherford Institute at 4,
Virginia v. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003) (No. 01-1107) (arguing the Commonwealth is
trying to prohibit "controversial" speech because of its impact).
291 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
292 See Lawrence, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence, supra note 172, at 796.
293 See BELL, supra note 5, at 84 (describing white residents' support for perpetrators
of racial violence); JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARSIE 171-202 (1985) (detailing white com-
munity support for anti-integrationist activities in Canarsie, N.Y.); THOMAS J. SUGRUE,
THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS 230-58 (1996); Howard Pinderhughes, The Anatomy
of Racially Motivated Violence in New York City: A Case Study of Youth in Southern
Brooklyn, 40 Soc. PROBS. 478, 489-91 (1993) (describing community support for racially
motivated violence in Brooklyn, N.Y.).
294 The underenforcement of bias-motivated crimes like cross burnings is not inevita-
ble. Cross burning may be investigated by police in a way that is victim-centered, provided
[Vol. 39
Free Expression by the Light of Fiery Crosses
who had had high hopes of staying in their new homes leave, having been
"crimed out" by racists. 295
If properly written and interpreted, cross-burning statutes can be an
important tool in the arsenal of those wishing to address neighborhood vio-
lence and to help promote housing integration. The most effective stat-
utes would be those which give states broad leeway to prosecute those
burning crosses directed at victims, not just those whom the state can show
intended intimidation. The Supreme Court's decision in Black, while it
goes further than R.A.V in appreciating the harm caused by cross burn-
ing, does not represent a victim-centered perspective. By restricting the
power of state statutes to address particular types of cross burning, Black
limits the power of states to address a harm which the Court has identified
as significant. A context-based, victim-centered approach to applying First
Amendment protection to cross burning recognizes that cross burning is
not protected hate speech, but constitutionally proscribable hate crime.
that the appropriate legal and policy structures exist. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 5, at 90-
106 (describing aggressive investigation of cross burning by specialized hate crime unit).
295 See, e.g., id. at 34-35, 46-47 (detailing story of victim of neighborhood violence
who eventually left the neighborhood).
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